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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-35-26(2)(a) (1953 as amended) and Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2-2(3)(i) and (4)(a) (1953 as amended) whereby a defendant in a 
criminal case may take an appeal to the Supreme Court from a final 
judgment of conviction of a first degree felony which may 
subsequently be transferred to this Court. Mr. Carlos R. Sampson was 
convicted of Criminal Homicide, Murder in the Second Degree, a first 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1953 as 
amended) in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah. 
v m 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did Mr. Sampson invoke his right to counsel; and, if 
so, did police officers fail to clarify his equivocal request for 
counsel; and, if so, did Mr. Sampson later waive that right? 
2. Did the trial court err when it failed to either 
rehabilitate two jurors who expressed bias or remove them for cause? 
3. Were photographs and slides that reached the jury over 
objections so prejudicial to warrant reversal of Mr. Sampson's 
conviction? 
4. Did the trial court erroneously apply Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-14-3 to the facts of this case thereby necessitating a new 
trial; and, if not, is that statute unconstitutional? 
5. Was there insufficient evidence to sustain the 
conviction of Mr. Sampson? 
6. Did the trial court improperly instruct the jury on 
depraved indifference such that reversal is warranted? 
7. Did the prosecutors misbehave in a manner which placed 
evidence before the jurors they were not entitled to hear and which 
probably affected their verdict? 
8. Were the cumulative errors and irregularities of this 
trial enough to require reversal of Mr. Sampson's conviction? 
ix 
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Art. I, § 7 of the Constitution of Utah provides: 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty 
or property, without due process of law. 
Art. I, § 12 of the Constitution of Utah provides: 
Sec. 12 [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall 
have the right to appear and defend in person and 
by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to 
testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the 
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process 
to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own 
behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an 
impartial jury of the county or district in which 
the offense is alleged to have been committed, and 
the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance 
shall any accused person, before final judgment, 
be compelled to advance money or fees to secure 
the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall 
not be compelled to give evidence against himself; 
a wife shall not be compelled to testify against 
her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor 
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the 
same offense. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 provides in pertinent part: 
76-5-203. Murder in the second degree. 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder in the 
second degree if the actor: 
(a) intentionally or knowingly causes the 
death of another; 
(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury 
to another, he commits an act clearly 
dangerous to human life that causes the death 
of another; 
(c) acting under circumstances evidencing a 
depraved indifference to human life, he 
engages in conduct which creates a grave risk 
of death to another and thereby causes the 
death of another; or 
(2) Murder in the second degree is a felony of 
the first degree. 
xi 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205 provides: 
76-5-205. Manslaughter. 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter if 
the actor: 
(a) recklessly causes the death of another; 
or 
(b) causes the death of another under the 
influence of extreme emotional disturbance 
for which there is a reasonable explanation 
or excuse; or 
(c) causes the death of another under 
circumstances where the actor reasonably 
believes the circumstances provide a legal 
justification or excuse for his conduct 
although the conduct is not legally 
justifiable or excusable under the existing 
circumstances. 
(2) Under Subsection (l)(b), emotional 
disturbance does not include a condition resulting 
from mental illness as defined in Section 76-2-305, 
(3) The reasonableness of an explanation or 
excuse under Subsection (l)(b), or the reasonable 
belief of the actor under Subsection (l)(c), shall 
be determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable 
person under the then existing circumstances. 
(4) Manslaughter is a felony of the second degree, 
Utah Code Ann. §77-14-3 provides: 
77-14-3. Insanity or diminished mental 
capacity—Notice requirement—Expert testimony. 
(1) When a defendant proposes to offer 
evidence that he is not guilty as a result of 
insanity or that he had diminished mental capacity 
or any other testimony of a mental health expert 
to establish mental state, he shall, at the time 
of arraignment or as soon afterward as 
practicable, but not fewer than 30 days before the 
trial, file and serve the prosecuting attorney 
with written notice of his intention to claim the 
defense. 
(2) When either the prosecution or the 
defense intends to call any mental health expert 
to testify at trial regarding a defendant's mental 
state, excluding rebuttal testimony, the expert 
shall be required to prepare a written report of 
xii 
findings, and counsel intending to call the expert 
shall provide a copy of any report to opposing 
counsel as soon as practicable, but not less than 
ten days before trial. 
(3) If the defendant fails to meet the 
requirements of Subsection (1), he may not 
introduce evidence tending to establish the 
defense unless the court for good cause shown 
otherwise orders. 
(4) Nothing in this section is intended to 
require the admission of evidence not otherwise 
admissible. 
Rule 18 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides in 
pertinent part: 
Rule 18. Selection of jury. 
. . . . . 
(e) The challenge for cause is an objection 
to a particular juror and may be taken on one or 
more of the following grounds: 
(13) having formed or expressed an 
unqualified opinion or belief as to whether 
the defendant is guilty or not guilty of the 
offense charged; or 
(14) that a state of mind exists on the 
part of the juror with reference to the 
cause, or to either party, which will prevent 
him from acting impartially and without 
prejudice to the substantial rights of the 
party challenging; but no person shall be 
disqualified as a juror by reason of having 
formed or expressed an opinion upon the 
matter or cause to be submitted to such jury, 
founded upon public rumor, statements in 
public journals or common notoriety, if it 
satisfactorily appears to the court that the 
juror can and will, notwithstanding such 
opinion, act impartially and fairly upon the 
matter to be submitted to him. 
xiii 
Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
CARLOS REINALDO SAMPSON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 890327-CA 
Priority No. 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for 
Criminal Homicide, Murder in the Second Degree, a first degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1953 as amended), 
following a jury trial held September 22-30, 1987, in the Third 
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
the Honorable David S. Young, Judge, presiding. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Carlos Reinaldo Sampson was born September 3, 1960. At 
the age of seven months, he contracted Spinal Meningitis (T. 75),1 
described as "a serious infection of the brain that can cause brain 
damage11 (S2. 8). Carlos is borderline mentally retarded (S2. 8-9). 
He spent his school years in special education classes (T. 691) and 
1 Citations to the record throughout this brief will be 
as follows: "T" will mean trial transcripts Volumes I-VI, inasmuch 
as their pagination is sequential; "PHT" will refer to the 
preliminary hearing transcript; "JS" will reference the jury 
selection transcript; "SI" and S2" will indicate the sentencing 
hearings; and "MS" will signify the motion to suppress hearing. 
has demonstrated a difficulty with reasoning and common sense from 
Kindergarten throughout his years (T. 691, 725-26). Although Carlos 
ultimately graduated from high school, it was a struggle and not 
without great family sacrifice (T. 701). He continued to have 
trouble with responsibility throughout his adult life (T. 698, 700, 
732, 737-38). 
Carlos Sampson and Antoinette Matthews met on July 14, 
1984 as she was walking with her luggage near the bus stop in 
San Bernardino, California (T. 751). A relationship began between 
them which included sexual relations. Within days or weeks, 
Antoinette Matthews became pregnant with Carlos1 child (T. 32). At 
the the time, both Antoinette and Carlos were living at home with 
their respective mothers. On April 25, 1985, a baby girl was born 
to Carlos and Antoinette and she was named Miyako Rayiesh Sampson 
(T. 33). 
After the birth of Miyako, Antoinette and her daughter 
lived with Antoinette's mother for approximately six weeks and then 
moved in with Carlos (T. 35). The three of them moved into a studio 
apartment in San Bernardino, California in July of 1985 (T. 35). 
At a birthday party in Carlos1 honor in September of 
1985, Carlos was introduced to cocaine (T. 39-40, 763). Carlos1 use 
of cocaine ultimately encouraged Antoinette to move back to her 
mother's house in October of 1985 taking Miyako with her. Carlos' 
father, Don Re Sampson, living in Salt Lake City, Utah, heard of the 
drug use. In November 1985, he brought Carlos to Utah, where he and 
Carlos' twin brothers, Adrian and Aaron, also lived and could watch 
- 2 -
out for and monitor Carlos1 life style. As intended, the drug usage 
stopped (T. 763). 
While in Utah, Carlos lived with his brother Aaron at his 
apartment (T. 764). Carlos would telephone Antoinette nearly every 
day to talk with her and to see how she and Miyako were doing 
(T. 764). Monthly telephone bills reached nearly $300 (T. 658). 
Plans were often discussed that Antoinette and Miyako would come to 
Utah to live with Carlos; marriage was also contemplated (T. 767). 
Ultimately, Antoinette and Miyako moved to Utah in April 
of 1986. They moved in with Carlos, who was still staying at his 
brother's apartment (T. 768). Carlos and Antoinette often argued, 
and, at times, the arguments would become physical exchanges. One 
incident discussed often at trial was an exchange where Antoinette 
attempted to choke Carlos, who then slapped her (T. 770). That 
incident precipitated Antoinette's moving from Aaron's apartment to 
the YWCA in July of 1986. Antoinette and Miyako lived at the Y for 
three weeks. During that time, Carlos would walk thirty blocks to 
visit Miyako and Antoinette (T. 772). Antoinette and Miyako then 
moved to an apartment located at Third South and Third East in Salt 
Lake City (T. 773). 
Carlos was seeing a lot of Miyako, keeping her nights 
while Antoinette worked. Antoinette then became involved in church 
and became "saved." After that, she told Carlos she didn't want him 
around any longer because he was a sinner and wasn't keeping up his 
responsibilities (T. 774). Nonetheless, Carlos continued to have 
contact with Antoinette and Miyako. At times, he would come to her 
- 3 -
house and "hang around" until Antoinette returned so that he could 
see his daughter Miyako (T. 774-75). 
On one occasion, Carlos was invited to Antoinette's house 
for dinner. Upon arriving at the appropriate hour, no one was 
home. He left the apartment and walked to the corner grocery store 
to see if perhaps Antoinette and Miyako were there buying some 
last-minute purchases for dinner. Upon returning to the apartment, 
he noticed a male crawling out the bedroom window of Antoinette's 
apartment (T. 777). Carlos became more and more frustrated with how 
Antoinette treated him and with his inability to maintain what he 
considered his family unit (T. 774). At that point, Carlos began 
asking Antoinette for a visiting schedule or list to be made of when 
he could see his daughter Miyako (T. 774-75). Such a list was never 
prepared and became a critical and volatile issue between Carlos and 
Antoinette. 
In early October 1986, Antoinette and Miyako moved to an 
apartment on Atherton Drive in Salt Lake City. Soon thereafter, 
they took a train trip back to California to visit family. Carlos 
did not want them to go and tried to physically restrain Antoinette 
from leaving. She spit in his face and he relented and took them to 
the train station (T. 775-76). At the station, Carlos again 
insisted she not go and even boarded the train to try to convince 
her. Antoinette and Miyako left anyway; they returned a week later 
(T. 776). 
Around 7:00 a.m. on November 24, 1986, Carlos awakened 
Antoinette by knocking on the door to her apartment (T. 48). Carlos 
- 4 
desired to take Miyako to work with him. Antoinette resisted 
because she and Miyako had been with Carlos before on his job and 
Carlos would have to leave the truck on occasions, which, without 
Antoinette's presence, would leave Miyako alone in the pickup truck 
(T. 779-80). Carlos persisted, and Antoinette eventually relented 
and told Carlos he could take Miyako with him later that day 
(T. 781). 
Antoinette then informed Carlos of her intentions to take 
Miyako to California for Thanksgiving two days later. Carlos 
disapproved because his family—father and wife, brothers Aaron and 
Adrian and their girlfriends and children—were planning to spend 
the holiday together. Carlos felt bad because he wanted his 
family—Antoinette and Miyako—to go with him to the Thanksgiving 
dinner and, if they didn't, he would be alone (T. 51). Carlos and 
Antoinette then compromised that Carlos could take Miyako later that 
day and spend the rest of the day and night with her and bring her 
back in time for Miyako and Antoinette to go to church prior to 
catching the train for California (T. 51-52). 
Carlos left for work and Antoinette returned to bed. 
Moments later, Carlos again knocked on the door. Antoinette 
answered and Carlos explained that his truck battery was dead and 
that "it needed a jump" (T. 52). Antoinette assisted him to get the 
truck started. She then again returned to bed. Approximately 
fifteen minutes later, Carlos telephoned and asked whether Miyako 
was ready yet for him to pick her up (T. 53). Carlos said he was on 
his way from Adrian's house and would be there momentarily. 
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Antoinette took Miyako, got in the car, drove around the block, and 
then parked where she could watch the apartment (T. 53-54). She 
watched Carlos arrive and leave, and then she returned to the house 
and went back to bed. Antoinette admitted having done the same 
things on other occasions—arrange for Carlos to pick up Miyako and 
then leave with Miyako until Carlos had come and gone (T. 54). 
Approximately 3:00 p.m. that same day, Carlos called 
again to see if he could come and get Miyako. Antoinette agreed. 
Carlos arrived ten minutes later. Miyako was in the bathtub. 
Carlos washed her hair and got her out of the tub (T. 55-56). 
Antoinette then dressed her and prepared a diaper bag. Miyako left 
with Carlos between 3:00 p.m. and 4:00 p.m. (T. 60). 
Shortly after Carlos and Miyako left, Antoinette received 
another telephone call, again from Carlos, who again wanted to talk 
about visitation rights (T. 62). He indicated that he wanted 
Antoinette to draw up a schedule for when he could have Miyako 
(T. 63). Antoinette responded that Carlos had been keeping her a 
lot lately without any troubles and questioned the necessity of a 
schedule. Carlos insisted she draw up a paper before she leave for 
California and that, if not, Miyako would not be going with her 
(T. 63). Carlos hung up the telephone. 
Antoinette then went to the apartment where Carlos was 
staying with his brother Aaron and Aaron's roommate, Curtis Owens. 
Antoinette arrived there around 4:30 p.m. She informed Carlos that 
she did not have to draw up the paper before leaving and that she 
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would wait to do it after she returned from California (T. 783-84). 
Antoinette further threatened that, if he did not return Miyako the 
next day so that she could go to church and then to the train 
station, Antoinette would take Carlos1 name off the birth 
certificate, terminating all his legal rights to Miyako (T. 69, 
784-85). 
Antoinette and Carlos further discussed the trip to 
California. Carlos asked whether Antoinette would take Miyako to 
see his mother while there. Antoinette said that she would 
(T. 70-71). Carlos then indicated that he would bring back Miyako 
as originally planned because he wanted his mother to see Miyako 
(T. 70-71, 121). 
After Antoinette left Aaronfs apartment, Miyako cried 
because her mother had left (T. 71). Carlos went to the couch with 
Miyako; he felt terrible (T. 786). Carlos went to the kitchen and, 
when he turned around, Miyako was off the couch and playing with his 
drink. He hit Miyako, demanding she leave the drink alone 
(T. 786). She cried. Moments later, Carlos again noticed that 
Miyako was playing with his drink. He grabbed her and hit her again 
(T. 786-88). 
Sometime later, Carlos walked Miyako down the hall to 
Aaron's bedroom (T. 185). They passed by Curtis Owens, who was in 
his bedroom; Carlos had Miyako wave to Curtis (T. 185). Curtis 
testified that he then heard Carlos chastising Miyako, followed by 
muffled sounds which Curtis demonstrated by striking his fist on his 
leg (T. 186-87). Later, when Curtis left his bedroom to go to the 
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refrigerator, he returned and stepped into Aaron's room telling 
Carlos to change the child's diaper (T. 189-90). He at that point 
noticed the child was motionless on the bed as if sleeping (T. 189). 
Within a short period of time, family members began 
arriving for the Monday night football game. Miyako was left in 
Aaron's room, ostensibly taking a nap. Throughout the next couple 
of hours, Miyako was on the couch, apparently sleeping, or on 
Carlos' shoulder sleeping or returned to the bedroom where she 
slept. Other children were present in the apartment playing during 
the football game. Yet, Miyako did not stir. 
Several of the attendees at the football game that 
evening commented that, in retrospect, perhaps it was odd that 
Miyako had slept so intensely during the football game. However, no 
one that evening was concerned with the behavior of Miyako nor did 
they indicate anything was so far out of character to draw 
particular attention (T. 154). Shortly after half-time, Carlos 
placed Miyako on his shoulder and left the apartment. He told the 
individuals there he was going to return the baby to Antoinette 
(T. 152). Carlos went to the telephone booth near his home, 
telephoned Antoinette, and received no answer (T. 791). 
Carlos then placed Miyako in the truck and drove to 
American Fork (T. 825-26). He unclothed the dead baby. Upon 
arriving in American Fork, Carlos decided to place Miyako's body in 
a garbage bag and to put the garbage sack in a dumpster 
(T. 827-28). Carlos then returned to Salt Lake City and went to the 
7-Eleven. He walked into the 7-Eleven and told the two clerks there 
- 8 -
that his daughter had been kidnapped (T. 251, 829-30). He asked 
them to please call the police and then he left the premises 
(T. 246), telling the clerks that he was looking for his baby. 
Carlos returned momentarily and talked to the police on the 
telephone, giving the description of the child and what she was 
wearing. The police responded in mass as twenty-six officers were 
looking for the missing Miyako (T. 279). Police investigators 
talked to the family and, for much of the evening, the search 
continued. Carlos was eventually asked to come down to police 
headquarters the next morning so that they might question him and 
submit him to a polygraph examination. 
The following morning at 10:30, Carlos arrived at police 
headquarters, where he was met by Sgt. Elliott, who explained the 
workings of a polygraph machine, read him his Miranda rights, and 
then proceeded with the polygraph interrogation. (The method of 
obtaining a waiver of his Miranda rights was challenged by defense 
counsel at trial (MS. 1-38).) After the polygraph examination, 
Sgt. Elliott accompanied Mr. Sampson to a location where Sheriff 
Hayward was speaking with other officers and informed both 
Mr. Sampson and the Sheriff that he believed his answers to be 
untruthful. Sheriff Hayward then accompanied Mr. Sampson back to 
the same interrogation room; he told Carlos he did not believe he 
had been telling the truth. He asked whether Carlos knew the 
whereabouts of his child. At that point, Carlos asked Sheriff 
Hayward for a cigarette; the Sheriff stepped out and returned within 
seconds with a cigarette (T. 428). Carlos stood up, placed his hand 
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on Sheriff Hayward's shoulder, and told him, "my baby's dead" 
(T. 428-29). 
Sheriff Hayward and Detective Judd then placed Carlos in 
the back of a police cruiser, and Carlos directed them to the 
location in American Fork where he had placed Miyako's body in a 
garbage bag and then, in turn, the dumpster (T. 429-33). The body 
was recovered (T. 433). 
The medical examiner indicated that the cause of death 
was a severe laceration of the liver with asphyxia as a possible 
component of death, as well (T. 574, 621). 
Prior to trial, the defense filed a motion to suppress 
statements given by Mr. Sampson and any evidence derived from those 
statements inasmuch as those statements and that evidence was 
received in violation of the prophylactic protections to the fifth 
amendment commonly referred to as the Miranda rights (MS. 5-6). 
That motion was denied (MS. 37). However, defense counsel sought 
and obtained a continuing objection to all such evidence (T. 371-72), 
During voir dire, several jurors indicated their 
inability to be impartial jurors regarding the subject matter of 
this case. Two jurors, in particular, were challenged for cause on 
that basis (JS. 151-58). The trial court, however, denied those 
challenges for cause requiring the defense to use a peremptory 
challenge (JS. 156). 
During the course of the trial, a motion in limine was 
argued before the court to exclude various photographs, slides and a 
video tape depicting the body of Miyako Sampson from the dumpster 
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scene or regarding the autopsy. The trial court granted the motion 
to exclude the video tape but admitted, over objection, the 
photographs and slides (T. 450-51). 
During the defense case, the defense indicated a desire 
to call a psychologist to the stand to rebut testimony in the 
State's case-in-chief. The State objected to that proffered 
testimony. The trial court agreed with the State and precluded the 
psychologist from testifying over the objection of the defense 
(T. 722). 
During the course of trial, the defense objected to the 
behavior of the prosecutors and, specifically, at one point moved 
for a mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct (T. 217). That 
motion was denied (T. 219). 
The defense took exception to the court's failure to give 
several of the defense's requested instructions including two 
distinct instructions on the law pertaining to depraved 
indifference. During deliberations, the jury sent out a question to 
the judge asking for clarification regarding the depraved 
indifference instruction; the court refused to clarify that 
instruction (R. 322). 
Ultimately, the jurors returned with a verdict of guilty 
of Second Degree Homicide against Mr. Sampson. He was subsequently 
sentenced to five years to life at the Utah State Prison, where he 
currently resides. This appeal followed. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Police officers violated Mr. Sampson's fifth amendment 
safeguards when they failed to clarify an equivocal request for 
counsel and continued with interrogation warranting reversal of his 
conviction. 
The trial court prejudiced Mr. Sampson's right to a fair 
trial by failing to excuse two jurors for cause who indicated their 
inability to be impartial. 
Slides and photographs were admitted over defense 
objections which inflamed the jury and denied Mr. Sampson his 
guaranteed fair trial by impartial jurors. 
The trial court applied Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-3 in a 
manner which precluded Mr. Sampson from having a witness testify for 
his defense and which violated his rights of fundamental fairness 
and due process. 
Insufficient evidence was adduced at trial to support 
Mr. Sampson's conviction of Second Degree Homicide. 
Mr. Sampson suffered prejudice when the trial court 
improperly instructed jurors on the theory of depraved indifference. 
Prosecutorial misconduct inflamed the jurors against 
Mr. Sampson and likely impacted on their verdict thereby requiring 
that Mr. Sampson's conviction be reversed. 
The cumulative effect of the errors and irregularities in 
this case demand that the conviction against Mr. Sampson be reversed. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. POLICE INTERROGATION OF MR, SAMPSON VIOLATED 
HIS RIGHTS AS OUTLINED IN MIRANDA AS PROTECTING 
THE FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS AGAINST 
SELF-INCRIMINATION. 
Prior to trial, Mr. Sampson filed a motion to suppress 
statements made by him in three different interrogation sessions as 
well as the evidence adduced from those statements inasmuch as they 
were the product of Miranda violations (R. 93-142). That motion was 
renewed at trial and incorporated into the record (T. 371-72). The 
trial court, nonetheless, denied the motion (R. 169). Mr. Sampson 
asserts that the trial court committed reversible error when it 
denied that motion. 
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the United 
States Supreme Court established the importance of protecting the 
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The Court in 
that opinion required that custodial interrogation be preceded by 
advising the person being interrogated that, inter alia, he has the 
right to the presence of an attorney during questioning. Miranda, 
384 U.S. at 471. The Miranda Court then recognized that, under 
certain circumstances, the person being interrogated may validly 
waive the right to counsel. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475. However, the 
Court noted that if the interrogation continues without the presence 
of an attorney, the State has a heavy burden of establishing a valid 
waiver of the accused's privilege against self-incrimination and his 
right to counsel. Id.; see also Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 
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490 n. 14 (1964). Moreover, courts adhere to the law outlined in 
Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977), that they are to 
"indulge in every reasonable presumption against waiver." Brewer, 
430 U.S. at 404; see also United States v. Cherry, 733 F.2d 1124, 
1131 (5th Cir. 1984); and United States v. Prestigiacomo, 504 
F.Supp. 681, 684 (E.D.N.Y. 1981). 
Miranda v. Arizona further states that if the person 
being interrogated "indicates in any manner and at any stage of the 
process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking 
there can be no [further] questioning." 384 U.S. at 444-45 
(emphasis added). In Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91 (1984), the 
Supreme Court stated: 
An accused in custody, "having expressed his 
desire to deal with the police only through 
counsel is not subject to further interrogation by 
the authorities until counsel has been made 
available to him," unless he validly waives his 
earlier request for the assistance of counsel. 
Id. at 94-95 (quoting Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 
(1981)). The Smith Court, calling this a "rigid prophylactic rule," 
then maintained that the first inquiry was to determine whether the 
accused actually invokes his right to counsel. See, Edwards v. 
Arizona, 451 U.S. at 484-85; and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 
444-45. 
The Smith Court also recognized that a person being 
interrogated may invoke the right to counsel either unequivocally or 
equivocally. If the person being interrogated expresses his desire 
for counsel in an unequivocal manner, then the rule laid out in 
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Edwards v. Arizona applies. That "bright-line rule" requires that 
"all questioning must cease after an accused requests counsel." 
Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. at 98 (citing Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 
638, 646 (1984)). Under Edwards, once counsel is requested "courts 
may admit an accused's responses to further questioning only upon a 
finding that he (a) initiated further discussions with the police, 
and (b) knowingly and intelligently waived the right he had 
invoked." Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. at 95 (citing Edwards v. 
Arizona, 451 U.S. at 485, 486 n. 9). 
The Smith Court announced that an accused's request for 
counsel also may be invoked in an ambiguous or equivocal manner. 
Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. at 95. The Court acknowledged the 
development among lower courts of conflicting standards as to the 
consequences of equivocal invocations of the right to counsel. The 
Court stated, "We need not resolve this conflict in the instant 
case, however, because the judgment of the Illinois Supreme Court 
must be reversed irrespective of which standard is implied." 
Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. at 96. The Court outlined the three 
conflicting standards in a footnote to the opinion. It reads: 
(1) Some courts have held that all questioning 
must cease upon any request for or reference to 
counsel, however equivocal or ambiguous. (2) 
Others have attempted to define a threshold 
standard of clarity for such requests, and have 
held that requests falling below this threshold do 
not trigger the right to counsel. (3) Still 
others have adopted a third approach, holding that 
when an accused makes an equivocal statement that 
"arguably" can be construed as a request for 
counsel, all interrogation must immediately cease 
except for narrow questions designed to "clarify" 
the earlier statement and the accused's desires 
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respecting counsel. 
Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. at 96 n. 3 (citations omitted). 
In State v. Griffin, 754 P.2d 965 (Utah App. 1988), this 
Court adopted the third option indicated in the United States 
Supreme Court's opinion of Smith v. Illinois. This Court noted: 
We therefore adopt the clarification approach and 
hold that when an accused makes an arguably 
equivocal request for counsel during custodial 
interrogation, further questioning must be limited 
to clarifying the request. If the request is 
clarified as a present desire for assistance of 
counsel, all questioning must cease as if an 
initial unambiguous request had been made. If, 
however, the accused, absent police persuasion, 
indicates he does not want counsel present at that 
time, the interrogation may continue. 
State v. Griffin, 754 P.2d at 969. In State v. Griffin, the 
exchange between the appellant and the interrogator was as follows: 
GRIFFIN: [responding to the specific 
allegations] This is a lie. I'm calling an 
attorney. 
DET. STRONG: OK, are you saying you don't want to 
talk anymore? 
GRIFFIN: No, I ain't saying that, I'm just saying 
it's a lie. I am going to talk to an attorney. 
Id. at 966-67. The Court found that the appellant's remarks 
constituted an equivocal request for counsel; the Court then found, 
however, that police interrogators appropriately clarified the 
request. 
In this case, Carlos Sampson arrived, at the request of 
the police, at the Ninth Floor of the Metropolitan Hall of Justice 
to submit to a polygraph examination on November 25, 1986, at 
11:15 a.m. (PHT. 94). The examiner, a Sgt. Syd Elliott, spent 
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substantial time explaining the polygraph and its history to 
Mr. Sampson (R. 116-19). Mr. Elliott then explained that this 
polygraph examination was 
being conducted in conjunction with a criminal 
matter, that is a police report. Because you are 
in the cop shop, there is no doubt in your mind 
that this is the police station, and, because you 
are taking a polygraph from a law enforcement 
agency, I must advise you of your rights again. 
(R. 119). Sgt. Elliott then read Mr. Sampson his Miranda rights. 
After reading Mr. Sampson his rights, Sgt. Elliott asked 
if Carlos understood the rights. Mr. Sampson replied, "yes." Then 
the following colloquy occurred: 
SGT. ELLIOTT: OK. Having these rights in mind, 
do you wish to talk to me now? 
SAMPSON: Well, uh, should I have a lawyer, I 
mean, well, I'm really not worried about anything, 
it is just that . . . ." 
ELLIOTT: OK, if you are not worried about 
anything, I would say that is fine, let's go ahead 
and proceed. Let's get this thing done and get it 
over with and see what we can do. 
SAMPSON: I'm willing to get it over with. 
(R. 120). The polygraph examination then continued to its 
conclusion, after which Sgt. Elliott escorted Mr. Sampson to the 
captain's office where Sheriff N. D. "Pete" Hayward was located 
(PHT. 99-100). Sheriff Hayward returned with Mr. Sampson to the 
interrogation room and continued questioning Mr. Sampson. Sheriff 
Hayward did not read Mr. Sampson his Miranda rights (PHT. 80). 
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A. THE INTERROGATION OF MR. SAMPSON WAS CUSTODIAL. 
The threshold question, as outlined above, is whether 
this interrogation session was custodial so that the Miranda 
protections attached. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 461. 
"By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning 
initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken 
into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any 
significant way." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 444. 
"Interrogation," as subsequently defined, includes "not 
only . . . express questioning, but also any words or actions on the 
part of the police . . . that the police should know are reasonably 
likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." Rhode 
Island v. Innes, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980). 
The same concerns for self-incrimination that attend a 
routine custodial-questioning session are present during a lie 
detector test, in which anything a defendant says can be used 
against him. State v. Wright, 477 A.2d 1265, 1269 (M.J. 1984). The 
Supreme Court of New Jersey, in a case involving the custodial 
nature of a polygraph test, stated, "We find little merit in the 
State's suggestion that questioning that takes place before, during, 
or after a lie detector test is somehow materially different from 
'custodial interrogation.'" _Id. at 1268-69. Moreover, the United 
States Supreme Court, in the case of Wyrick v. Fields, 459 U.S. 42, 
47 (1983), accepted the premise that a polygraph test is 
interrogation. 
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The context in which Mr. Sampson found himself during the 
polygraph examination and subsequent interrogation was custodial. 
Mr. Sampson was instructed to show up at the police station, and, 
upon arrival, he was taken to an eight-foot by ten-foot 
interrogation room occupied by one desk and two chairs (PHT. 77). 
Sgt. Syd Elliott explained the polygraph test, reminding Mr. Sampson 
that he was "in the cop shop" and "taking a polygraph from a law 
enforcement agency" (R. 119). Sgt. Elliott then read Mr. Sampson 
his rights (R. 120). Sgt. Elliott remained with Mr. Sampson the 
entire time he was there, only leaving him when he surrendered 
custody of him to the Sheriff, Pete Hayward (PHT. 92). 
Additionally, Sgt. Elliott testified at the preliminary 
hearing that Mr. Sampson was a suspect from the outset of the 
examination and that suspicions against Mr. Sampson increased during 
the interrogation (PHT. 100-01). Sgt. Elliott also testified that 
he did not know whether Mr. Sampson could have left. Furthermore, 
during cross-examination with Sheriff Hayward, the Sheriff also 
admitted that he possibly would not have let Mr. Sampson leave had 
he so desired. All of this information plus the subjective 
understanding of Mr. Sampson indicates that he was in custody and 
that he was not free to leave and break up police questioning. 
Therefore, Mr. Sampson was, in fact, under a custodial interrogation 
and the Miranda protections attached. 
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B. MR. SAMPSON INVOKED HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL. 
Although Mr. Sampson's statement, "Well, uh, should I 
have a lawyer, I mean, well, I'm really not worried about anything, 
it is just that . . . ," fell short of being an unequivocal request 
for counsel, the statement reaches the level of an ambiguous and 
equivocal request or invocation of the right to counsel. This fact 
is especially true in light of the fact that Sgt. Elliott actually 
interrupted the completion of Mr. Sampson's statement when he 
stated, "OK, if you are not worried about anything, I would say that 
is fine, let's go ahead and proceed . . . ." (R. 120). 
Numerous opinions address the nature and types of 
equivocal requests for counsel. In White v. Finkbeiner, 611 F.2d 
186 (7th Cir. 1979), the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
stated that a request for counsel need not be explicit. Relying on 
the "if the accused indicates in any manner" language of Miranda, 
that court stated that "[t]o require a person in custody to be even 
more specific would be to ignore the language in Miranda . . . ." 
White v. Finkbeiner, 611 F.2d at 190. The accused's statement found 
to be equivocal in Finkbeiner was, "in some form, 'I'd rather see an 
attorney.'" 
Other statements by an accused being interrogated which 
were found to be equivocal are: "Maybe it would be good to have a 
lawyer?" United States v. Prestigiacomo, 504 F.Supp. 681, (E.D.N.Y. 
1981); "Why should I not get an attorney?" United States v. Cherry, 
773 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir. 1979); "Maybe I should have an attorney." 
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Maglio v, Jago, 580 F.2d 202, 205 (6th Cir. 1978); "I had better 
talk to a lawyer." United States v. Clark, 499 F.2d 802, 805 (4th 
Cir. 1974); "Might want to talk to a lawyer." United States v. 
Fouche, 776 F.2d 1398, 1404 (9th Cir. 1985); "I would like to have a 
lawyer, but I'd rather talk to you." Nash v. Estelle, 597 F.2d 513, 
516 (5th Cir. 1979); "Do you think I need an attorney?" State v. 
Smith, 661 P.2d 1001, 1003 (Wash. App. 1983); and "When do you think 
I'll get to see a lawyer?" Hall v. State, 326 S.E.2d 812, 818 (Ga. 
1985). 
In comparison, the statement of Mr. Sampson—irrespective 
of the interruption by Sgt. Elliott—is an equivocal request for 
counsel. To require more of a young man under the charge of police 
for the first time in his life (twenty-six years old) would limit 
the protections of the fifth amendment to only those who are most 
assertive and articulate; all others would be incapable of 
effectively exercising their fifth amendment rights. Hampel v. 
State, 706 P.2d 1173 (Alaska 1985). 
As this Court noted in State v. Griffin, 754 P.2d 965 
(Utah App. 1988) , 
[W]hen an accused makes an arguably equivocal 
request for counsel during custodial 
interrogation, further questioning must be limited 
to clarifying that request. 
Id. at 969. Other courts agree: 
[W]henever even an equivocal request for an 
attorney is made by a suspect during custodial 
interrogation, the scope of that interrogation is 
immediately narrowed to one subject and one only. 
Further questioning thereafter must be limited to 
clarifying that request until it is clarified. 
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Thompson v. Wainwright, 601 F.2d 768 (5th Cir. 1979) (emphasis in 
original) (citing Nash v. Estelle, 597 F.2d 513 (5th Cir. en banc 
1979)). 
In United States v. Cherry, 773 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir. 
1984), the Fifth Circuit reiterated, with emphasis, its earlier 
theme: 
No statement taken after an equivocal request is 
made and before it is clarified as an effective 
waiver of the present assistance of counsel can 
clear the Miranda bar. 
773 F.2d at 1131 (emphasis in original). In Cherry, the Court found 
that the defendant's murder confession was given only after agents 
failed to clarify the defendant's equivocal request for counsel. 
Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit Court reversed the lower court who 
erroneously had admitted the confession into evidence. Cherry, 773 
F.2d at 1131-32. 
By interrupting and cutting off Mr. Sampson's equivocal 
request for counsel, Sgt. Syd Elliott was far afield from the only 
permissible area of clarification. Sgt. Elliott's response to 
Mr. Sampson was as follows: 
SAMPSON: Well, uh, should I have a lawyer, I 
mean, well, I'm really not worried about anything, 
it is just that . . . . 
ELLIOTT: OK, if you are not worried about 
anything, I would say that is fine, let's go ahead 
and proceed. Let's get this thing done and get it 
over with and see what we can do. 
(R. 120). This response is not clarification; rather, the response 
was persuasion and presumption. As such, the response was 
impermissible under the fifth amendment protections as designated by 
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this Court. In State v. Griffin, this Court indicated: 
If . . . the accused, absent police persuasion, 
indicates he does not want counsel present at that 
time, the interrogation may continue. 
754 P.2d at 969 (emphasis added). Sgt. Elliott did not clarify 
Mr. Sampson's request for counsel. Sgt. Elliott impermissibly 
persuaded Mr. Sampson to proceed despite his concern. Consistent 
with State v. Griffin, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has 
stated, "[S]uch measures [persuasion and presumption] are foreign to 
the purpose of clarification, which is not to persuade but to 
discern." Thompson v. Wainwright, 601 F.2d at 772. 
Other courts are also in agreement. One court stated 
that persuasion and presumption "constitutes a subtle temptation to 
the unsophisticated, indigent accused to forego the right to counsel 
at this critical moment." United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 
467 F.2d 1248, 1250 (7th Cir. 1972). Yet another court explained: 
[T]he need to avoid any undue influence or 
coercive effect on the accusedfs right to request 
the presence of counsel during an interrogation 
makes it imperative that certain limits be placed 
on the manner in which ambiguous or equivocal 
questions concerning the availability of counsel 
may be answered. We believe those limits are 
exceeded when an interrogating officer chooses to 
answer a question in a way which the officer knows 
or should know will be reasonably likely to 
discourage the accused from asserting the right to 
counsel. 
Hampel v. State, 706 P.2d 1173, 1181 (Alaska 1985). 
Sgt. Syd Elliott's failure to clarify Mr. Sampson's 
equivocal request for counsel was error. He exacerbated that error 
by persuading Mr. Sampson to refrain from invoking his right. His 
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actions belittled the importance of the right to counsel. In one 
breath, Sgt. Elliott informed Mr. Sampson of his right to counsel, 
then in the next breath, he presumed its insignificance and 
persuaded against its invocation. Sgt. Elliott was under an 
obligation to clarify the remark of Mr. Sampson; he failed to do 
so. Accordingly, Sgt. Elliott, and then Sheriff Hayward who relied 
on Sgt. Elliott's erroneous behavior, violated the fifth amendment's 
protective prohibition on further interrogation without clarifying 
an arguably equivocal invocation of the right to counsel. 
C. AFTER EQUIVOCALLY INVOKING THE RIGHT TO 
COUNSEL, MR. SAMPSON DID NOT LATER WAIVE THAT 
RIGHT. 
Although the burden to show waiver rests with the State, 
see, e.g., State v. Moore, 697 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1985), 
Mr. Sampson's statements cannot be twisted to show a waiver. 
Because Sgt. Elliott failed to clarify the equivocal request and 
merely proceeded with inadmissible interrogation, subsequent 
statements flowing from that interrogation are incapable of passing 
the Miranda bar. United States v. Cherry, 733 F.2d at 1131; see, 
e.g., Hampel v. State, 706 P.2d at 1180-81 (unless statements are 
clarified, responses to subsequent interrogation is subject to grave 
doubt). Additionally, the facts of this case do not support a later 
waiver. 
The closest thing to a waiver in this case would be the 
statement following Sgt. Elliott's interruption wherein Mr. Sampson 
stated, "I'm willing to get it over with" (R. 120). Mr. Sampson, at 
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Sgt. Elliott's urging, then signed the waiver form (R. 121). 
However, as stated earlier, the State has the burden of proving that 
the waiver was voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently made. 
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444; State v. Moore, 697 P.2d at 236. "That 
burden becomes far more difficult, if not impossible, to sustain 
when the record shows that a request for counsel was made which was 
not honored before questioning continued." Maglio v. Jago, 580 F.2d 
202, 205 (6th Cir. 1978); see also United States v. Heldt, 745 F.2d 
1275, 1278 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing United States v. Vandusen, 431 
F.2d 1278, 1280 (1st Cir. 1970)) (burden increases when confusion is 
apparent). 
Furthermore, courts view a waiver which follows so soon 
after the initial request as suspect. White v. Finkbeiner, 611 
F.2d 186, 193 (7th Cir. 1979). Courts, with fundamental rights at 
stake, must interpret equivocal statements in the light most 
favorable to the accused, Ld. at 190, and courts also indulge every 
reasonable presumption against waiver. United States v. Cherry, 733 
F.2d 1124, 1131 (pet. cert. 1984) (citing Brewer v. Williams, 430 
U.S. 387, 404 (1977)). 
Finally, a valid waiver cannot be established by showing 
only that the accused responded to further police-initiated 
custodial interrogation. Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 98 (1984) 
(citing Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484 (1981)). 
As Sgt. Elliott made no attempt to clarify Mr. Sampson's 
request for an attorney but rather responded in a manner to persuade 
against the invocation of that right and to diminish the importance 
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of that right, the State cannot meet their burden of showing a valid 
waiver. Accordingly, the subsequent statements of Mr. Sampson as 
well as the evidence derived from those statements were inadmissible 
at trial and should have been suppressed. The trial court's ruling 
to the contrary, admitting those statements, and evidence derived 
from those statements, was prejudicial error. 
The trial court committed prejudicial error by admitting 
not only polygraph statements but also statements and derivative 
evidence obtained through the post-polygraph interrogation session 
conducted by Sheriff Hayward. The Sheriff had not renewed the 
Miranda warnings with Mr. Sampson nor had he obtained a waiver; 
rather, he mistakenly relied upon the constitutionally infirm waiver 
obtained by Sgt. Elliott (PHT. 80). Therefore, all evidence derived 
from the statements were also inadmissible and should have been 
suppressed. It was prejudicial error for the trial court to fail to 
grant Mr. Sampson's pre-trial motion to suppress. 
D. MR. SAMPSON'S STATEMENTS TO DETECTIVE JUDD ON 
NOVEMBER 25, 1986, WERE ADMITTED IN VIOLATION OF 
THE MIRANDA PROTECTIONS. 
On November 25, 1986, following the discovery of Miyako's 
body, Police Detective Dick Judd conducted an interrogation of 
Carlos Sampson on the Ninth Floor of the Hall of Justice at 
4:50 p.m. This interrogation session, in toto, is violative of 
Miranda and is progeny because the police, not Mr. Sampson, 
initiated the questioning. Accordingly, all statements flowing from 
the interrogation should be suppressed and held inadmissible at 
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trial. 
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. at 484-85, holds 
unequivocally that "an accused . . . having expressed his desire to 
deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further 
interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made 
available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further 
communication, exchanges, or conversations wit 
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derivative evidence. 
The recent case of Shea v. Louisiana, 470 U.S. 51 (1985), 
supports this position. In Shea, the United States Supreme Court 
was examining whether Edwards v. Arizona applied retroactively to 
cases still pending on direct appeal in state courts. Shea v. 
Louisiana, 470 U.S. at 52. The facts of the case, however, are 
similar to the case now at bar. Petitioner Shea had been arrested 
for two counts of Armed Robbery and was taken to the police 
station. At the station, his Miranda rights were read to him and he 
signed a standard Miranda card. He then invoked his right to 
counsel and police appropriately terminated the interview. 
The following afternoon before Shea had spoken with an 
attorney, a police officer returned and informed Shea that he would 
be transferred to another jail. Then, without any indication from 
petitioner that he was willing to be interrogated, the officer asked 
if Shea wanted to talk about the case. Miranda rights were again 
read to Shea, who again signed the Miranda card. Shea then gave an 
oral confession that he had committed the two robberies. Shea v. 
Louisiana, 470 U.S. at 52. 
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Louisiana, that court 
held that an Edwards violation had occurred when the police had 
initiated a second interrogation which produced the confession. 
That court also held, however, that Edwards v. Arizona would not 
apply retroactively. Shea v. Louisiana, 470 U.S. at 53-54. The 
case was then appealed to the United States Supreme Court and 
certiorari was granted to decide the issue of retroactivity of 
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Edwards v. Arizona. Shea, 470 U.S. at 54. Important to the instant 
case is that all parties in Shea agreed that an Edwards violation 
occurred on the facts as stated. Shea, 470 U.S. at 53 n. 1. 
The circumstances of Mr. Sampson's case very closely 
parallel the Shea facts. The only distinction is that after 
Mr. Sampson invoked his right to counsel during the polygraph 
interrogation, the officer ignored the request and continued the 
interrogation. This distinction, however, is insignificant as in 
Edwards v. Arizona, the Supreme Court stated: 
[W]e now hold that when an accused has invoked his 
right to have counsel present during custodial 
interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot 
be established by showing only that he responded 
to further police-initiated custodial 
interrogation even if he has been advised of his 
rights. 
451 U.S. at 484 (footnote omitted). Therefore, the fact that 
Mr. Sampson continued answering questions during the polygraph and 
post-polygraph interrogation sessions is insignificant. Also 
insignificant is the fact that Mr. Sampson again signed the waiver 
form prior to a second interrogation session. As in Shea v. 
Louisiana, the mere fact that police initiated the subsequent 
interrogation session is violative of Mr. Sampson's rights, and all 
statements flowing therefrom must be suppressed. 
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the trial court's 
erroneous denial of the motion to suppress. Mr. Sampson's 
conviction should therefore be reversed and a new trial ordered. 
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POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE 
ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO REMOVE FOR CAUSE TWO 
JURORS WHO ADMITTED THE INABILITY TO BE IMPARTIAL. 
Following individual voir dire of the jury panel, counsel 
for both sides challenged several jurors for cause (R. 364 at 
151-158). Mr. Sampson urges that the trial court committed 
reversible error in failing to grant the challenges for cause of two 
jurors. He insists these errors violated his substantial rights and 
require reversal of his conviction and a new trial. 
The sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States 
Constitution and Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution 
afford an accused the right to a trial by an impartial jury. The 
Utah Legislature has complied with these constitutional mandates by 
providing an accused with the right to challenge a juror for actual 
bias and remove that juror from the panel. State v. Brooks, 563 
P.2d 799, 801 (Utah 1977). By statute, Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-18(e) 
(1953 as amended), a particular juror may be challenged for cause 
whenever, inter alia, the juror has formed an opinion as to the 
guilt or innocence of the accused or whenever the juror has a state 
of mind with reference to either the cause or a party which will 
prevent the juror from acting impartially and without prejudice to 
the substantial rights of the challenging party. See Addendum A for 
pertinent text of the statute. 
The Utah Supreme Court has long recognized that the 
procedural rule and the Utah Constitution are violated and that 
reversal of subsequent convictions is required whenever a trial 
court fails to excuse a biased juror for cause thereby forcing the 
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accused to utilize a peremptory challenge to remove the juror. See 
State v. Jones, 734 P.2d 473, 474 (Utah 1987), and cases cited 
therein. Recently the Court has reiterated that, once the inference 
of impartiality or prejudice of a juror is revealed, an abuse of the 
trial court's discretion may occur unless (1) that juror is removed 
from the panel or (2) the inference of impartiality is rebutted. 
State v. Cobb, 107 Utah Adv. Rep. 43, 44 (Utah 1989) (citing 
State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 451 (Utah 1988)). "Impartiality1' is 
defined as "a mental attitude of appropriate indifference." Id. 
The Supreme Court has further instructed that the 
inference of bias must be rebutted by demonstrating that such bias 
"was merely a 'light impression1, not one which would 'close the 
mind against the testimony that may be offered in opposition.1" 
State v. Bailey, 605 P.2d 765, 768 (Utah 1980). Again, the failure 
to either remove the juror or to investigate further until the 
inference of bias is rebutted constitutes an abuse of discretion by 
the trial court. _I<3. These standards outlined by the Supreme 
Court, and recognized and adopted by this Court, State v. Wilson, 
105 Utah Adv. Rep. 19, 23 (Utah App. 1989), are analytically 
reinforced by the rationale announced in Jenkins v. Parrish, 627 
P.2d 533 (Utah 1981), where the Court instructed that the exercise 
of the trial court's discretion is to be viewed "in light of the 
fact that it is a simple matter to obviate any problem of bias 
simply by excusing the prospective juror and selecting another." 
Id. at 536. 
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A. JUROR BELL 
Mr. Sampson insists the trial court abused its discretion 
in denying the challenge for cause of juror Connie Rae Bell, forcing 
him to exercise a peremptory challenge to correct that error and 
remove her from the panel. 
An examination of the individual voir dire of Mrs. Bell 
reveals that her remarks unveiled a facial question of her bias 
and/or prejudice. That voir dire discussion further reveals that 
those remarks went unrebutted as the trial court did not 
rehabilitate Mrs. Bell. Accordingly, the court necessarily should 
have excused Mrs. Bell for cause, and the failure to do so was 
reversible error. 
The entire individual voir dire of Mrs. Bell is as 
follows: 
JUDGE YOUNG: Mrs. Bell, the reason we brought you 
[in] individually is because we wanted to have the 
opportunity to discuss anything that would be of 
concern to you in considering this case as to 
whether you could consider it fairly and 
impartially. First, I've indicated earlier that 
the crime involved the victim, a 19-month-old 
child. The body was recovered from a dumpster. 
Does that—obviously no one would enjoy sitting on 
a case like this, but would the fact of a 
19-month-old child cause you for any reason to 
feel you could not be fair and impartial in 
rendering a decision in this case? 
MRS. BELL: Kind of. 
JUDGE YOUNG: What is the basis you think that 
would be? 
MRS. BELL: Just because I think I know kids can 
get on your nerves and they can just be trying at 
times, but I think there's always something you 
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can do to take 'em somewhere or, you know, if they 
were that—I don't know what the situation was. 
JUDGE YOUNG: Let's suppose that there is a 
situation where a parent disciplines a child in 
such a way that the parent doesn't realize the 
magnitude of that discipline but that the child 
dies, the parent didn't intend that death. If you 
knew that and believed that would that allow you 
to be able to find the defendant is not guilty of 
that crime? 
MRS. BELL: Yeah, I guess, if he really didn't 
think, or whomever it was, didn't think that they 
was harming, but I think any time--a baby is so 
fragile. Any time that you start hitting it 
you've got to know it's going to hurt it some way. 
JUDGE YOUNG: Do you feel that you could be fair 
and impartial in considering the evidence when the 
evidence is presented in this case? 
MRS. BELL: I'd try. 
JUDGE YOUNG: All right. 
MRS. BELL: That's all I could say. I don't know— 
JUDGE YOUNG: Have you heard of this case in the 
media before? 
MRS. BELL: No, it doesn't come to my mind. We 
talk about things at work but this one really 
doesn't come to mind. 
JUDGE YOUNG: What is your education? 
MRS. BELL: 12th Grade. 
JUDGE YOUNG: High school graduate? 
MRS. BELL: High school. I went to Trade Tech for 
day classes. 
JUDGE YOUNG: Is there any reason you believe, if 
you were accused of this crime, that someone with 
your views should not sit in this jury? 
MRS. BELL: I guess not. 
JUDGE YOUNG: Any questions from the prosecution? 
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MS. LEWIS: No, nothing. 
JUDGE YOUNG: From the defense? 
MR. VALDEZ: I have none. 
MS. BOWMAN: Does the fact that you have a baby 
that's 17 months old and the fact that the victim 
in this case was 19 months old raise a particular 
concern with you? 
MRS. BELL: Well, that's why I say it would be 
hard for me to think because I know they can be 
trying, they do get on your nerves and its hard 
but I just think you would know if you was hurting 
the baby. I mean, I just think you would know. 
JUDGE YOUNG: All right. Thank you, Mrs. Bell. 
(Whereupon, Mrs. Lott was brought in to chambers). 
(JS. 88-90). 
Following voir dire, Mr. Sampson moved to excuse 
Mrs. Bell for cause, noting: 
MR. VALDEZ [defense co-counsel]: Yes, we'd 
challenge juror No. 6, Connie Bell. She indicated 
several times that she could not be impartial, 
that she could try but it would be very hard to be 
impartial. 
MS. BOWMAN [defense co-counsel]: I think you 
would know if you hurt the baby. She said, "I 
think you'd know if you were hurting a baby." 
MR. VALDEZ: Coupled with the fact she has a 
17-month-old child. I think that would probably 
add to the impartiality of her decision and I 
think she, to quote her, "It would be hard to be 
impartial in this case." In fact, several times 
she said she can't be impartial. 
(JS. 152). 
The trial court later ruled on the challenge of 
Mrs. Bell, stating: 
JUDGE YOUNG: Let me tell you what I will do. 
Connie Rae Bell, No. 6, I will not excuse for 
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cause. I acknowledge she said she felt she could 
not be impartial, she said he had difficulty, but 
I felt she was rehabilitated in her other 
responses. 
(JS. 156). Contrary to the court's assertion, Mrs. Bell was never 
fully rehabilitated. The inference of bias remained unrebutted and 
was not of "light impression" but rather was central to the issue of 
whether Mr. Sampson may have knowingly murdered his daughter 
Miyako. Mrs. Bell's repeated comments—and final word on the 
matter—were that "You would know if you was hurting the baby. I 
mean I just think you would know" (JS. 90). Such comments indicate 
the bias of Mrs. Bell was a "strong and deep emotion" which would 
prevent her from acting impartially and without prejudice to the 
substantial rights of Mr. Sampson. See State v. Wilson, 105 Utah 
Adv. Rep. at 23; Rule 18(e)(14), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
(1980) . 
Because the court did not excuse Mrs. Bell from the 
venire nor rehabilitate her expressions of the inability to be 
impartial, the court abused its discretion. See, e.g., State v. 
Hewitt, 689 P.2d 22, 26 (Utah 1984). As Mr. Sampson was then 
required to waste a peremptory challenge to correct that which the 
trial court should have done (R. 271), he suffered prejudice and his 
conviction must be reversed. 
B. JUROR ERICKSON 
Following individual voir dire, both the State and 
Mr. Sampson challenged juror Helen F. Erickson for cause. Defense 
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counsel urged: 
We go on to juror #10, Helen Erickson, who 
basically said she was a grandma and it would 
impair her ability to be impartial. She felt 
children are so innocent that they should not be 
hurt. I think the court did a little 
rehabilitation on her but I think she was very 
reluctant to sit as a juror because she felt she 
could not render a fair and impartial decision 
(JS. 153). 
The State concurred in the challenge for cause indicating, "With 
reference to [No.] 10 I believe her answer was that she feels she 
couldn't be fair. That's what my note says. So I'd have to agree" 
(JS. 156). The court ruled: 
JUDGE YOUNG: You are both joining in the request 
then on 10. However, I will not grant it in 
relation to 10. I think you'll have to use a 
peremptory challenge on 10. I don't think the 
expression of her concern she is a grandmother, 
she is a concerned person, but I don't think that 
expression was sufficient for me to dismiss for 
cause (JS. 156). 
The individual voir dire of juror Erickson was as follows: 
JUDGE YOUNG: Please have a seat. The reason we 
brought you in with the other jurors individually 
is that we want to provide maximum opportunity for 
anybody to state anything that would be of concern 
in dealing with this case. Would the fact that 
this case involves a 19-month-old child and the 
fact that the child's body was recovered from a 
dumpster impair your ability to sit in judgment in 
this case? 
MRS. ERICKSON: I think so. 
JUDGE YOUNG: All right. Now, nobody would enjoy 
the experience of sitting in a difficult case such 
as this that has that kind of fact situation, but 
do you believe that you could not be fair and 
impartial in considering the evidence simply 
because the child was of that age? 
MRS. ERICKSON: Yes. 
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JUDGE YOUNG: Why? 
MRS. ERICKSON: 'Cause they are so innocent and 
just can't understand it, 
JUDGE YOUNG: And that would be hard for you? 
MRS. ERICKSON: Uh-huh. 
JUDGE YOUNG: Nonetheless, if you believe that 
that event did occur and—would you be able to 
convict the defendant of it? 
MRS. ERICKSON: I don't know. It would be a tough 
one. 
JUDGE YOUNG: If you believe the event did not 
occur would you be able to acquit the defendant? 
MRS. ERICKSON: You mean if it wasn't a child 
involved? 
JUDGE YOUNG: Nof if you believed the event did 
not occur as prosecuted by the State, that they 
did not bear their burden of proof, would you be 
able to find the defendant not guilty? 
MRS. ERICKSON: I guess. 
JUDGE YOUNG: Have you seen or heard anything of 
this case in the media? 
MRS. ERICKSON: No, nothing. 
JUDGE YOUNG: What is your education? 
MRS. ERICKSON: High school. 
JUDGE YOUNG: Other than what you have stated 
previously, if you were accused of this offense, 
would there be any reason you would not want 
someone with your mind, set or disposition to sit 
in judgment of you? 
MRS. ERICKSON: I just can't imagine it happening 
to me. 
JUDGE YOUNG: Thank you, Mrs. Erickson. 
(JS. 96-98). 
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As with juror Bell previously, the trial court refused to 
excuse this juror after she had indicated she could not be fair and 
impartial. Mrs. Erickson was not successfully rehabilitated. Even 
the State concurred in the challenge for cause. Inasmuch as the 
judge did not excuse her nor rehabilitate her, he abused his 
discretion when he failed to grant the challenge for cause requiring 
that Mr. Sampson utilize a peremptory challenge to remove her from 
the jury. 
Mr. Sampson's peremptory challenges were otherwise 
utilized, and Mrs. Erickson actually sat as a juror in this case 
establishing that prejudice inhered to Mr. Sampson by the trial 
court's abuse of discretion in failing to excuse her for cause. 
Exacerbating the court's error in failing to dismiss juror Erickson 
for cause on the basis of her voir dire responses is the fact that 
the State had joined in the assessment of the need to excuse the 
juror for cause. Therefore, the court's failure to remove juror 
Erickson violated the clear instruction of Utah case law indicating 
"it is a simple matter [for the court] to obviate any problem of 
bias simply by excusing the prospective juror and selecting 
another." Jenkins v. Parrish, 627 P.2d at 536. 
Because the trial court failed to excuse either or both 
Mrs. Bell and Mrs. Erickson, Mr. Sampson's substantial rights were 
violated and his conviction must be reversed and his case remanded 
to the trial court for a new trial. 
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POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE 
ERROR WHEN IT ADMITTED OVER OBJECTION PREJUDICIAL 
PHOTOGRAPHS AND SLIDES OF THE DEAD CHILD'S BODY. 
The admission into evidence of prejudicial photographs is 
governed at base by Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. That 
rule states: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence (1983). However, Utah case law has 
extended some categories of evidence beyond the rulefs balancing of 
probativeness versus unfair prejudicial effect. The Supreme Court 
has indicated: 
[0]ur past decisions have recognized that inherent 
in certain categories of relevant evidence is an 
unusually strong propensity to unfairly prejudice, 
inflame, or mislead a jury. Evidence in these 
categories is uniquely subject to being used to 
distort the deliberative process and improperly 
skew the outcome. 
State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1256 (Utah 1988). The Court has 
concluded that gruesome photographs of a homicide victim's corpse 
must be placed in this unique category of evidence. State v. Cloud, 
722 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 1986), and State v. Garcia, 663 P.2d 60, 
63-64 (Utah 1983). The Court consequently decided that: 
when evidence falling within such a category is 
offered, we have required a showing of unusual 
probative value before it is admissible under rule 
403. In the absence of such a showing the 
probative value of such evidence is presumed to be 
"substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice." 
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State v, Lafferty, 749 P.2d at 1256. 
Accordingly, gruesome photographs of the victim must meet 
a threshold requirement of "essentiality" even before the Rule 403 
balancing occurs. See State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d at 752. 
"Essentiality11 is defined as that evidence which conveys relevant 
information that cannot readily be presented by less potentially 
prejudicial means. I^d. Only after establishing the essentiality of 
gruesome photographs does the inquiry turn to the balancing of 
probativeness versus unfair prejudice. 
Under Rule 403's balancing test, "unfair prejudice" means 
more than having an adverse effect on the party's case. Most 
evidence offered by an opponent will have such an effect. "Unfair 
prejudice," rather, means "an undue tendency to suggest decision on 
an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional 
one." Advisory Committee Note to Rule 403, Federal Rules of 
Evidence (1975). Unfair prejudice may be determined by examining: 
whether the evidentiary value of what the photograph conveys can be 
put before the jury readily and accurately by other means not 
accompanied by the potential prejudice; whether the photographs are 
black and white or in color; whether the photographs are closeups or 
enlargements; whether the facts of the case are disputed by the 
defendant; the degree of gruesomeness of the photographs; the 
cumulative nature of the evidence; and when the photographs were 
taken in relation to the crime. State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d at 1257 
(citing State v. Cloud, 722 P.d at 752-54; State v. Garcia, 663 P.2d 
at 63-64; State v. Wells, 603 P.2d 810, 812-13 (Utah 1979); State v. 
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Ross, 501 P.2d 632, 635-36 (Utah 1972); State v. Poe, 471 P.2d 870, 
872 (Utah 1970); State v. Poe, 441 P.2d 512, 514-15 (Utah 1968)). 
Finally, the responsibility of weighing relevance against 
prejudice is that of the trial judge, and his decision should not be 
overturned unless it is shown to be an abuse of discretion. 
State v. Poe I, 441 P.2d at 515. Once error is determined to have 
occurred, the reviewing court must assess whether that error is 
prejudicial or harmless. State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d at 754. That 
determination is measured by examining whether the error likely 
affected the substantial rights of the defendant. Id. (citing 
Rule 103(a), Utah Rules of Evidence (1983); and Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-35-30(a)). The Utah Supreme Court has recently clarified this 
language to mean reversal is required when there is a reasonable 
likelihood that the error complained of affected the outcome of the 
trial. State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116 (Utah 1989). 
In this case, the prosecutors indicated an intent to 
introduce photographs, slides and a video tape into evidence. 
Mr. Sampson objected urging that most of the photographs, the slides 
and the video tape were not essentially relevant, insisting that 
they be excluded inasmuch as they were more prejudicial than 
probative. The trial court excluded the video tape. However, over 
the objection of defense counsel, the trial court admitted the 
photographs and the slides (T. 394, 451, 452, 459, 583-84, 587-88). 
A continuing objection was granted to the admission of the 
photographs and the slides (T. 450-51). 
Mr. Sampson now asserts that the trial court abused its 
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discretion when it permitted the photographs and slides to reach the 
jury. Specifically, (A) the photographs and the slides failed to 
meet the threshold requirement of essentiality; and, even where 
essentiality might have been met, (B) the photographs and slides 
were not more probative than prejudicial (they failed the base test 
of Rule 403) because (1) their only purpose was to inflame and 
arouse the sympathies of the jury and they had no evidentiary value 
except for that hoped-for emotional impact on the jury; (2) the 
photographs and slides were unnecessarily cumulative; (3) the 
photographs and slides functioned to confuse the issues before the 
jury; (4) the photographs and slides presented misleading 
information to the jury; and (5) the photographs and slides were 
unduly emphasized by the State in prosecuting this case. 
A. THE PHOTOGRAPHS AND SLIDES FAILED TO MEET THE 
THRESHOLD REQUIREMENT OF ESSENTIALITY. 
In State v. Cloud, the Utah Supreme Court reversed a 
Second Degree Homicide conviction because of the erroneous admission 
into evidence of gruesome photographs. The major error noted by the 
Court was that the State urged and the trial court applied an 
erroneous standard; the requisite finding of essential evidentiary 
value was never established despite defense urgings of that 
necessity. State v. Cloud, 722 P.d at 753. In this case, 
Mr. Sampson also urged on more than one occasion that the 
photographs and slides proffered by the State suffered from the same 
frailty, a lack of essential evidentiary value (T. 362-64, 551). As 
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in State v. Cloud, the trial court accepted the State's claim of 
mere relevance to be enough. 
This Court should find on the facts of this case that the 
photograph exhibits numbered 8-11 and 14-22 and all sixteen of the 
slides were admitted in error because they lacked essential 
evidentiary value. The photographs and slides of Miyako at the 
dumpster scene, including inside the garbage sack, and the 
photographs of her autopsy did not establish a critical element that 
the State was required to prove. 
The State suggested that the photographs and slides were 
important to establish mental state and that the photographs were 
simply not gruesome (T. 361-62). Both claims fail. 
First, the photographs and slides, as in State v. Cloud, 
do not establish mental state in any way. Cf. State v. Cloud, 722 
P.2d at 753-54 (where the Supreme Court found that the critical 
issue of mental state, urged as intentional murder—second 
degree—by the State, or extreme emotional distress—manslaughter— 
by the defense, was not advanced in any way by the photographs); see 
also State v. Bolsinger, 699 P.2d 1214, 1221 (Utah 1985) (where the 
Supreme Court ruled that "the reprehensible conduct of the defendant 
subsequent to [the victim's] death" was beyond the moment which 
subjected him to a charge of criminal homicide). 
The trial court, at the State's urging and over the 
objections of the defense, found the cause of death to be at issue 
in the case (T. 553, 557-59). The court made the above findings 
despite the defense's willingness to stipulate to the cause of death 
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(T. 558) even though it had never really been at issue (T. 550). 
The trial court then found that the photographs and slides would be 
admissible regardless of such a stipulation (T. 558-59). The 
ruling, therefore, was erroneous as no issue was advanced by the 
admission of the photographs and slides. 
Second, the State's contention that the photographs and 
slides were not gruesome is wrong. The State argued that: 
under the Cloud case that those photographs, 8 and 
9 in particular, these simply are not gruesome 
photographs. They aren't bloody. This person is 
not—they don't show wounds. So in terms of 
weighing prejudicial effect I think that we would 
argue that this is not the type of gruesome 
photograph that courts have been concerned about 
excluding . . .(T. 362). 
This interpretation misses the point of excluding photographs. 
"Gruesome" is not narrowly defined to just bloody photographs; 
rather, "gruesome," at base, focuses on the effect the photograph 
will have on the jury, i.e., whether the photograph "inflames or 
arouses the jury." State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d at 752-53. 
The term "gruesome" is defined as horribly repugnant or 
grisly. The Random House College Dictionary, revised edition 
(1984). Synonyms of "gruesome" are listed as shocking, horrid, 
distasteful, objectionable, and offensive. Jld. Examining the 
photographs and slides admitted into evidence leaves little doubt 
that they fit within the definition of gruesome. Photographs of a 
small, naked, 18-month-old child laying dead among the trash in a 
garbage bag (Nos. 8 and 9) and immediately after removal from the 
bag while laying in a state of rigor mortis (Nos. 10 and 11) are 
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gruesome. So, toof are autopsy photographs depicting the bruised 
frail body of the dead child from various angles, including 
photographs of internal organs pictured both in the natural setting 
of the body and removed therefrom (Exhibits Nos. 14-22 and slides 
Nos. 1-16). 
Importantly, even the prosecutors and the trial court 
noted the "gruesome," inflammatory and arousing nature of the 
photographs. At one point, the following discussion occurred: 
JUDGE YOUNG: Do you think it would be helpful if 
there were an explanation given to the jury in 
advance of these photographs that some are 
extremely explicit and are difficult to see? 
MS. LEWIS: I think it's an excellent thing. I 
think it is very appropriate. 
JUDGE YOUNG: It seems to me that this photograph 
[photograph exhibit No. 22, slide No. 7], for one 
not familiar with the course of procedures in an 
autopsy, can create concern and stress. 
(T. 535). Later the prosecutor inquired, nI wonder if we might also 
inquire of the people in the courtroom if they feel they are capable 
of handling this portion of the testimony [the slides] so that we 
don't have someone get sick or whatever in the audience" (T. 559). 
A final and critical consideration in determining the 
essentiality of photographs and slides is assessed by factoring in 
whether the allegedly key information can be provided to the jury in 
less potentially prejudicial means. State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d at 
752. In this case, the information in the slides and photographs 
was before the jury in other ways prior to their admission, and 
additional alternatives existed and were urged by the defense. The 
State had two doctors testify, Dr. Palmer and the medical examiner 
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Dr. Grey. The testimony of both standing alone was able to 
communicate any necessary information to the jury without the aid of 
pictures. See, in particular, the testimony of Dr. Grey at 
T. 560-69 and of Dr. Palmer at T. 389-91, 395-400. 
However, neither Dr. Grey nor Dr. Palmer was required to 
communicate without visual aids. Both doctors could have utilized 
the anatomy chart with front and back overlays on which to mark 
locations of bruises, etc., and on which they could have located 
critical organ locations to support their explanations (T. 520-26). 
Again, this method of communication was adequate to meet the 
purposes of Dr. Grey's testimony; and important to the examination 
of essentiality, the method was less prejudicing than the 
photographs and slides. 
Notably, the defense offered still other means which 
would have been as effective as photographs and slides but much less 
prejudicing. Counsel noted: 
Additionally, there are other options available to 
the State through which they can provide the 
information that the jury needs to decide the 
case. They have the option of using models, they 
have an option of bringing in a full size model 
with organs in it if they wish to show that on 
organs. They have the option of showing 
diagrams. They have already used one diagram with 
both anterior and posterior views that are plainly 
visible to the jury. They have the option of 
using models of the head. They certainly have the 
option of black and white photos and they have the 
option of getting their evidence in through 
testimony, and as was done yesterday through 
Dr. Marty Palmer's testimony, based upon having 
looked at the autopsy report as he did himself 
indicate (T. 551). 
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Further options suggested were x-rays (T. 541), cropping photographs 
(T. 545-46), and just using photographs without duplicative slides 
blown up on a large screen (T. 545). The trial court erred in not 
accepting and requiring any of these less prejudicial alternatives. 
In short, the trial court's ruling failed to ever address 
the threshold question of essentiality. As in State v. Cloud, the 
court erred in that failure. Therefore, this Court, as did the 
Supreme Court in Cloud, should find the admission of the photographs 
in whole or part to be reversible error. 
B. THE PHOTOGRAPHS AND SLIDES WERE MORE 
PREJUDICIAL THAN PROBATIVE. 
1. THE ONLY PURPOSE OF THE PHOTOGRAPHS AND SLIDES WAS TO 
INFLAME AND AROUSE THE SYMPATHIES OF THE JURY. In this case, no 
dispute existed over the injuries sustained by Miyako Sampson, nor 
over the cause or causes of death. The only issue in the case was 
whether Mr. Sampson committed a second degree homicide or a 
manslaughter (see Point V, infra). With that in mind, the 
photographs and slides that were admitted over objection were 
without any legitimate purpose. Their only value was to 
impermissibly inflame the jury and arouse the jurors1 passions 
against Mr. Sampson. Cases from the Utah Supreme Court have not 
permitted the admission into evidence of photographs without 
evidentiary value except for a hoped-for emotional impact on the 
jury. See State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d at 752-53; State v. Wells, 603 
P.2d at 813; and State v. Poe, 441 P.2d at 515. 
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Several examples of the prosecution's attempt to present 
visually inflammatory stimulus to the jury is found within the 
record. See Point VII, infra. Perhaps the best example is the 
State's attempt to introduce into evidence a video tape of the 
retrieval of Miyako's lifeless body first from the trash-filled 
dumpster and then from the garbage-filled plastic garbage sack and 
the prosecutor's reaction to the court's ruling excluding the video 
from evidence. After viewing the video tape, the trial court ruled: 
JUDGE YOUNG: I will say that I've got problems 
with this and it only adds duplication to the 
photographs that I've already admitted in the 
motion in limine. And I don't think it serves any 
additional probative value. It doesn't illustrate 
any better the fact of death. The fact of death 
is adequately established through the other 
photographs and I will grant the motion in limine 
in relation to the video tape (T. 368). 
The prosecutor responded by first questioning the court's perception 
of the quality of the tape and then by stating, 
MS. KNIGHT-EAGAN: If I could make one inquiry? 
By saying it's duplicative would the court 
consider allowing us the choice which we'd rather 
have in, the stills or the video? (T. 368-69). 
By either viewing the video tape or reading the trial court's 
response (T. 369), this Court can grasp the attempt by the 
prosecutors to put inflammatory materials before the jury. The 
child's body was in a state of rigor mortis and the video tape, 
although in black and white, is incredibly heartwrenching and 
emotionally arousing. 
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2. THE PHOTOGRAPHS AND SLIDES WERE CUMULATIVE TO 
THEMSELVES, EACH OTHER, AND OTHER TESTIMONY ADMITTED AT TRIAL, Rule 
403 allows relevant evidence to be excluded if it is cumulative. 
Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence (1983). Objections were lodged on 
this basis (T. 367, 545). Photographic exhibits numbered 14-22 were 
each repeated among the slides (T. 560-69). Additionally, the 
photographs and slides offered numerous views of the same bruises 
and injuries (T. 543). The distinction between some photographs and 
slides showing the same bruises was time only, an issue of literally 
no relevance to the case (T. 543-45). 
As indicated above, other methods of introducing the 
information to the jury were also used including oral testimony and 
the use of a full-bodied anatomy chart with front and back overlays 
(T. 520-26). The cumulative nature of the photographs and slides 
should have resulted in the exclusion of many, if not all, the 
photographs objected to by the defense. Reversible error resulted 
when the trial court failed to so rule. 
3. THE PHOTOGRAPHS AND THE SLIDES FUNCTIONED TO CONFUSE 
THE ISSUES BEFORE THE JURY. Rule 403 allows the exclusion of even 
relevant evidence which is outweighed by its possibility of 
confusing the issues before the jury. Rule 403, Utah Rules of 
Evidence (1983). The issues in this case were confused by the 
court, the State and most likely the jurors when the photographs and 
slides were utilized to establish mental state (T. 849, 869-70). As 
discussed above, that contention was incorrect and has resulted in 
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the reversal of convictions in the past. See State v. Cloud, 722 
P.2d at 754-55; and State v. Bolsinger, 699 P.2d at 1220-21. That 
same confusion of the issues in this case should also result in 
reversal. 
4. THE PHOTOGRAPHS AND SLIDES PRESENTED MISLEADING 
INFORMATION TO THE JURORS. Rule 403 allows relevant evidence to be 
excluded if the danger of misleading the jurors outweighs that 
relevance. Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence (1983). Several of the 
photographs and slides presented to the jury were misleading and 
required extra clarification which may have confused the jury. In 
particular, the autopsy photographs which showed the bruises on the 
chin (especially No. 16) presented a view of the neck which appeared 
as a strangulation-type injury because of refrigeration and the 
congealing and solidification of fat cells. Clarification was 
attempted (T. 567); however, jurors may have speculated on their 
own—especially after the prosecutor encouraged them to do so 
(T. 871). 
Additionally, many of the autopsy photographs revealed 
circular marks on the body which were not injuries but marks left by 
the autopsy table itself (T. 563-64, 568). Photographs and slides 
of the buttocks demonstrated injuries acquired during the autopsy 
procedures—slicing to determine bruise depth—and were not 
representative of death-related injuries (T. 568-69). Finally, 
photographs and slides of the internal organs were alleged to 
establish loss of blood by the liver tear (T. 565-66). Yet, laymen 
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are not readily aware whether intestines are normally coated with 
blood. 
Regarding each of these questions, oral testimony and 
reliance on the anatomy chart overlays would have sufficed without 
the misleading effects from the photographs. Accordingly, the 
photographs should have been excluded on the objection of the 
defense; reversible error should follow the trial court's failure to 
exclude the photographs. 
5. THE PHOTOGRAPHS AND SLIDES WERE UNDULY EMPHASIZED BY 
THE STATE IN PROSECUTING THIS CASE. Critical to the evaluation of 
prior Utah Supreme Court cases is the emphasis the photographs 
receive by the State. This case contains the full variety of 
emphatic use rebuffed in prior opinions. In addition to the 
aforementioned problems with the photographs and slides, they were 
all in color rather than black and white. The photographs were 
enlargements, approximately 8" x 10" and mounted suitable for 
framing. Exacerbating the enlargement of the photographs is that 
the slides were shown in a dimly lit courtroom and further enlarged 
to 41 x 5' dimensions (T. 545) or more (T. 562, 887) such that the 
jurors1 vision was more intently directed to the pictures. 
Additionally, many of the photographs were closeups. 
Also, several photographs were of full-body views whose purported 
evidentiary value was a focused bruise (T. 545). When asked whether 
the full-body picture could be cropped to only expose that injury to 
minimize the inflammatory nature inherent in a child murder case, 
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the State expressed its willingness to so crop the photographs 
(T. 546). The trial court, however, ruled that cropping was 
unnecessary (T. 546). 
Finally, the prosecutors emphasized the photographs by 
displaying them to the jurors during their closing arguments 
(T. 849, 863, 869-71). That type of emphasis has been hailed by the 
Court as especially demanding of judicial scrutiny on appeal. 
State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d at 754-55. The State in this case 
exaggerated rather than minimized the prejudicing nature of the 
photographs. The following cases support the assertion that the 
photographs were overemphasized, indicating the factors listed above 
as critical to that query. State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d at 1257; 
State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d at 752-54; State v. Garcia, 663 P.2d at 
63-64; State v. Wells, 603 P.2d at 812-13; State v. Poe, 441 P.2d at 
514-15. 
In conclusion, the photographs and slides utilized by the 
State in this case were nonessential, gruesome and otherwise 
violative of Rule 403 such that they should have been excluded by 
the trial court. The trial court erred when it failed to exclude 
the photographs and slides. Such an error cannot be overlooked by 
espousing the doctrine of harmless error. Rather, such an error 
goes to the very heart of the constitutionally protected rights of 
due process and fundamental fairness, to wit: the right to a fair 
and impartial jury. 
An error which so impressionably taints the impartiality 
of the fact finders cannot be harmless. As then Chief Justice Taft 
- 52 -
stated in Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927): 
[T]he requirement of due process of law in 
judicial procedure is not satisfied by the 
argument that men [and women] of the highest honor 
and the greatest self-sacrifice could carry it on 
without danger of injustice. Every procedure 
which would offer a possible temptation to the 
average man [or woman] . . . to forget the burden 
of proof requirement to convict the defendant, or 
which might lead him [or her] not to hold the 
balance nice, clear and true between the State and 
the accused, denies the latter due process of law. 
Such a denial has occurred in this case; that error requires 
reversal of Mr. Sampson's conviction. 
POINT IV. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE 
ERROR WHEN IT REFUSED TO ALLOW TESTIMONY FROM 
DEFENSE WITNESS DR. MICHAEL DECARIA. 
During the defense case, counsel for Carlos Sampson 
indicated he would call Dr. DeCaria as a witness. The State 
objected to the testimony invoking Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-3 (Supp. 
1988) as disallowing the testimony for failure to give the requisite 
notice of the statute. That statute reads: 
77-14-3. Insanity or diminished mental 
capacity—Notice requirement—Expert testimony. 
(1) When a defendant proposes to offer 
evidence that he is not guilty as a result of 
insanity or that he had diminished mental capacity 
or any other testimony of a mental health expert 
to establish mental state, he shall, at the time 
of arraignment or as soon afterward as 
practicable, but not fewer than 30 days before the 
trial, file and serve the prosecuting attorney 
with written notice of his intention to claim the 
defense. 
(2) When either the prosecution or the 
defense intends to call any mental health expert 
to testify at trial regarding a defendant's mental 
state, excluding rebuttal testimony, the expert 
shall be required to prepare a written report of 
findings, and counsel intending to call the expert 
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shall provide a copy of any report to opposing 
counsel as soon as practicable, but not less than 
ten days before trial. 
(3) If the defendant fails to meet the 
requirements of Subsection (1), he may not 
introduce evidence tending to establish the 
defense unless the court for good cause shown 
otherwise orders. 
(4) Nothing in this section is intended to 
require the admission of evidence not otherwise 
admissible. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-3 (Supp. 1988). 
The defense contended that Dr. DeCaria's testimony did 
not center on Mr. Sampson's insanity, diminished mental capacity, 
nor mental state and that the statute therefore was not applicable 
(T. 704-05). The defense further contended that Dr. DeCaria's 
testimony was rebuttal testimony and permissibly within the 
exception of the statute. The trial court, over defense objection, 
precluded Dr. DeCaria from testifying (T. 722). 
Mr. Sampson indicates that, under the facts of this case, 
Dr. DeCaria's testimony should have been admitted for good cause 
shown—to rebut the State's heavy emphasis on demeanor 
testimony—and that the court abused its discretion and erred when 
it refused to allow the testimony. Mr. Sampson further insists that 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-3 suffers from constitutional infirmities 
requiring the statute to be stricken and his case remanded to the 
trial court for new proceedings. 
A. DR. DECARIA SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO 
TESTIFY UNDER THE STATUTE. 
The prosecution complained to the trial court that the 
defense should have given them notice whether Dr. DeCaria would 
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testify at trial. The defense had told them he would not testify 
inasmuch as he had not examined Mr, Sampson. However, after the 
State's case, it became apparent to the defense that the State's 
repetitive testimony focusing on Mr. Sampson's calm demeanor needed 
to be rebutted. The State countered that the defense should have 
known from the preliminary hearing of the importance of the demeanor 
testimony and planned accordingly. 
The State's argument to the trial court was fallacious. 
On only four occasions during the preliminary hearing did the State 
question witnesses about Mr. Sampson's demeanor—once each to the 
Sheriff and the polygrapher, where the responses were situationally 
"relaxed and passive" and "tired but alert," respectively (PHT. 71, 
78), and twice to 7-Eleven clerk Wilken, who responded, "calm" 
(PHT. 105, 107). 
At trial, however, the State repeatedly questioned 
witnesses as to the demeanor of Mr. Sampson—sometimes as often as 
six times to a particular witness.2 The clear implication of the 
answers was that his calmness equated to that of a calculated and 
cold-blooded baby-killer. Even the trial court observed the 
emphasis on demeanor testimony and noted, 
There have been too many questions asked and 
answered repeatedly so far and I want--I think we 
can hone in on the evidence a little better 
without repeating them and going over them. I say 
2 Pages where demeanor testimony was elicited by the 
State are 146, 193, 244-48, 251, 252, 276, 279, 283, 294, 300, 317, 
321, 344, 345, 378, 430, 455, 466, and 477. 
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that to both sides. I'm not singling anybody 
out. I'm saying we have covered the same ground 
an awful lot. We have covered the same ground of 
the demeanor of the defendant repeatedly, 
repeatedly even with the same witness (T. 377-78). 
The heavy prosecution emphasis on demeanor testimony could not have 
been guessed, and Dr. DeCaria's testimony focusing on generic 
stressers and adjustment disorders, as explanative of how some 
people mask their emotions and appear to be calm as a coping 
mechanism, should have been allowed to reach the jury as outside the 
statute, within the exception of the statute, or under the "other 
good cause" language of the statute. The failure of the court to so 
rule clashed Mr. Sampson's rights to call witnesses in his own 
behalf with the notice requirement—a balancing that should have 
been found in his favor. 
Supporting the premise that Dr. DeCaria's testimony 
should have been admissible is the manner in which the court ruled 
regarding the testimony of Dr. Palmer, who testified for the 
prosecution. He testified regarding the accidental-nonaccidental 
nature of the injuries sustained by Miyako which was objected to by 
the defense on several grounds and allowed over those objections. 
The defense likened the proffered testimony of Dr. DeCaria to that 
of Dr. Palmer, who was allowed to testify for the State (T. 721). 
Nonetheless, the court ruled that Dr. DeCaria's testimony created an 
undue prejudice for the State because of the failure of notice under 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-3 (T. 722). This ruling was reached despite 
the State's awareness from the inception that Dr. DeCaria was a 
"player" in the case and a possible witness (T. 711). cf. State v. 
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Case, 547 P.2d 221 (Utah 1976). As the defense noted upon urging 
reconsideration of the testimony of Dr. DeCaria, 
Your Honor, with respect to the court's ruling 
yesterday you allowed us to take exception as part 
of your ruling. You indicated that you felt that 
the State would be unduly prejudiced if, in fact, 
we were allowed to call Dr. DeCaria. Just to 
clear the record up, I would submit to the court 
that the State has had access to investigators 
throughout this trial daily, they have been coming 
in and out of court every morning. Yesterday they 
had Creighton Horton here, they had David Yocom 
here, they had Bud Ellett here, Glen Iwasaki, 
Karen Knight-Eagan and Leslie Lewis. They have a 
budget in excess of eleven million dollars. I 
can't see where the State would have been 
prejudiced. I'm sure that, in fact, they could 
have or they would have been able to obtain a 
psychologist or psychiatrist to deal with what's 
been termed an adjustment disorder that comprises 
two and a half chapters in DSM-III. And I just 
can't see where they were prejudiced. I think 
they are not on trial; Mr. Sampson's on trial. 
And I think the fact you did not allow Dr. DeCaria 
to testify has seriously jeopardized his chances 
of receiving a fair trial. (T. 506-07). 
Notably, allowing Dr. Palmer's testimony over objections 
and disallowing the testimony of Dr. DeCaria worked a substantial 
denial of Mr. Sampson's rights to a fair trial under both the 
federal and state constitutions. Accordingly, this Court should 
correct the erroneous ruling of the trial court and reverse the 
conviction ordering that the case be remanded to the trial court for 
a new trial. 
B. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-14-3 PLACES AN 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTION ON AN ACCUSED'S RIGHT 
TO CALL WITNESSES IN HIS OWN BEHALF. 
If this Court upholds the ruling of the trial court 
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regarding the decision to preclude Dr. DeCaria's testimony, 
Mr. Sampson requests that this Court reach and examine the issue of 
the constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-3. Specifically, 
Mr. Sampson encourages this Court to find the statute 
constitutionally infirm, both facially and factually, for placing 
impermissible limitations on state and federal constitutional rights 
to due process and the right to compulsory process and to call 
witnesses in his own behalf. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-3 suffers from several problems, 
not the least of which is the ambiguity in the language "or any 
other testimony of a mental health expert to establish mental state" 
found in subsection (1). That language resurrects the question 
permeating a majority of the claims of error outlined in this 
appeal, to wit: whether Mr. Sampson's demeanor at various stages is 
relevant to his mental state at the time the child was killed. More 
particular to this issue is the question whether Dr. DeCaria, or any 
mental health expert, can address the mental state of the accused 
without having examined him. The court's ruling on the 
interpretation of the statute answered both these questions in a 
manner which deprived Mr. Sampson of precious state and federal 
constitutional rights. 
Mr. Sampson has the constitutional rights to compulsory 
process, which includes the fundamental right to present his 
defense. Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95 (1972); Washington v. Texas, 
388 U.S. 14 (1967). Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-3 clashes headlong into 
those rights by placing a procedural hurdle which, as in this case, 
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can work hardships to the accused as he presents his defense. As 
the United States Supreme Court noted in a similar area: 
In these circumstances, where constitutional 
rights directly affecting the ascertainment of 
guilt are implicated, the hearsay rule may not be 
applied mechanically to defeat the ends of justice. 
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973). 
In Washington v. Texas, the United States Supreme Court 
found a state statute which absurdly required that accomplices were 
incompetent to testify for one another was violative of due 
process. 388 U.S. 14, 23 (1967). The Washington Court reminded that 
the truth is more likely to be arrived at by 
hearing the testimony of all persons of competent 
understanding who may seem to have knowledge of 
facts involved in a case, leaving the credit and 
weight of such testimony to be determined by the 
jury or by the court. 
Id. at 22 (citing Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. at 471). 
Admittedly, the United States Supreme Court has recently 
ruled that an invocation of the right to compulsory process does not 
automatically prohibit exclusion of a defense witness1 testimony as 
a discovery violation sanction. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. , 
98 L.Ed.2d 798, 815 (1988). The Court in Taylor, however, 
emphasized a balance must occur between the state's interest in 
procedural concerns and the accused's rights to present a defense. 
That Court noted: 
The State's interest in protecting itself against 
an eleventh hour defense is merely one component 
of the broader public interest in a full and 
truthful disclosure of critical facts. 
Id. at 812 (quotations and citations omitted). In Taylor, the Court 
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characterized the statutory violation as "fit[ting] into the 
category of willful misconduct in which the severest sanction is 
appropriate." ixl. at 815. 
Mr. Sampson's facts are readily distinguishable from a 
willful violation of Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-3. The New Mexico 
Supreme Court recently reviewed Taylor v. Illinois and offered sage 
assessments. In McCarty v. State, 763 P.2d 360 (N.M. 1988), the 
court supported that Taylor should be narrowly constrained to its 
facts because preclusion of such defense testimony, with its 
constitutional base, is only appropriate in limited circumstances. 
Id. at 362. The McCarty court noted: 
Preclusion, however, constitutes a conscious 
mandatory distortion of the fact-finding process 
whenever applied. Before a defendant's sixth 
amendment rights are derogated as a sanction for 
non-compliance, a trial judge must exercise his 
discretion within recognized parameters, he must 
consider other available ways to enforce a 
criminal discovery rule. 
Id. at 364. 
The trial court in this case applied Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-14-3 in an unconstitutional manner which denied Mr. Sampson his 
constitutional rights under the sixth and fourteenth amendments. 
That error prejudiced his case by leaving critical State testimony 
unrebutted. Absent that error, the outcome of the case likely would 
have been different; therefore, reversal of Mr. Sampson's conviction 
is mandated. 
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POINT V. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL WAS 
INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN MR, SAMPSONfS CONVICTION 
OF SECOND DEGREE HOMICIDE, 
Mr. Sampson insists that the evidence adduced at his 
trial is incapable of sustaining the conviction he received of 
Second Degree Homicide. He requests this Court to reverse that 
erroneous conviction and either impose a conviction for Manslaughter 
or order that the charges against him be dismissed. 
In State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983), the 
Utah Supreme Court stated, " [Notwithstanding the presumptions in 
favor of the jury's decision, this court still has the right to 
review the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict." 
Further, the Court noted: 
We reverse a jury conviction for insufficient 
evidence only when the evidence is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the 
crime for which he was convicted. 
Id. This Court has adopted this very same standard for reviewing 
cases for the sufficiency of the evidence. See, e.g., State v. 
Garcia, 744 P.2d 1029, 1030 (Utah App. 1987). This standard 
restates the due process requirement which prohibits a criminal 
conviction in any case except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which the 
defendant is charged. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); 
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); State v. Sorenson, 758 P.2d 466 
(Utah App. 1988) . 
The State charged Mr. Sampson with Second Degree Homicide 
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under three alternative theories outlined in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-203 (1953 as amended). That section reads in pertinent part: 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder in the 
second degree if the actor: 
(a) intentionally or knowingly causes the 
death of another; 
(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury 
to another, he commits an act clearly 
dangerous to human life that causes the death 
of another; 
(c) acting under circumstances evidencing a 
depraved indifference to human life, he 
engages in conduct which creates a grave risk 
of death to another and thereby causes the 
death of another[.] 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1953 as amended). The State's evidence, 
both factually and as a matter of law, cannot support that 
Mr. Sampson committed a Second Degree Homicide under any of the 
theories proposed by the State. 
The cause of death is not disputed in this case. Miyako 
died of a severely lacerated liver with asphyxia also as a possible 
component of death (T. 871, 902). The only real issue in the case 
focuses on the mental state of Mr. Sampson at the time Miyako died 
(T. 845, 883). The statements and testimony of Mr. Sampson do not 
aid the State's claim that he intentionally killed his child or that 
he intentionally inflicted serious bodily injury on his child. He 
consistently denied any intent to kill or harm the child (T. 489, 
637, 789, 792). 
After clearing away the purely inflammatory arguments and 
the State's appeals to the passions of the jury, what remains is 
incapable of supporting a theory under either subsection (a) or 
(b). Attempts to characterize Mr. Sampson as cagey, intelligent, 
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cogent, etc. (T. 877) cannot be seriously entertained. The record 
belies that claim; Mr. Sampson has experienced severe coping 
dysfunction since his early childhood bout with Spinal Meningitis 
(T. 75). 
Similarly, the State's claim that Mr. Sampson possessed a 
plan to strike back at Antoinette (T. 850-51) is without basis and 
ignores essential facts of the case—most notably his desire to have 
the visitation schedule which spawned most of the arguments and his 
desire for the child to visit his mother while in California (T. 62, 
778, 783-84). 
The State also erroneously relies on the severity of the 
liver tear to infer intent to kill or intent to cause such damage 
(T. 870-71). Even supposing that a man intended that blow, it is 
doubtful he could muster the force required to inflict that damage 
as testified to by the medical doctors. Both doctors indicated the 
force would necessarily be equivalent to a car wreck or a horse kick 
(T. 410, 574-75, 873-74). Notably, the medical examiner indicated 
the same injury could be caused by compression from squeezing 
(T. 614). That explanation supported the version as explained by 
Mr. Sampson (T. 789) and is factually more feasible. 
If at all sustainable, the jury's verdict must rely on 
the depraved indifference theory of subsection (c). Again, however, 
the State's support for this theory is factually and legally 
bankrupt. The State placed its reliance for this point on the 
events which occurred after the death of Miyako, noting that those 
actions are as important as the events before the death (T. 862, 
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914). The State misapprehends the law. In State v. Bolsinger, 699 
P.2d 1214 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court dispelled that 
belief. The Bolsinger Court instructed that depravity must be found 
in the killing not the subsequent behavior. _Id. at 1220-21. The 
Court noted: 
The jury may well have been swayed by the 
reprehensible conduct of the defendant subsequent 
to [the victim's] death. But that conduct is not 
before us for review. The evidence is undisputed 
that Kaysie was dead when defendant rose from the 
bed. He himself covered her face with a sheet, a 
universal gesture acknowledging death. At that 
moment the conduct which subjected him to a charge 
of criminal homicide came to an endTT 
Id. at 1221 (emphasis added). 
In this case, the State argues that the child was dead 
before being carried from the house (T. 857). Events subsequent to 
that time, despite their ugliness, do not support a Second Degree 
Homicide conviction. Moreover, in Bolsinger, the Court cited cases 
demonstrative of depraved indifference (699 P.2d at 122); those 
cases, see, e.g., State v. Nicholson, 585 P.2d 60 (Utah 1978), are 
inapposite to the facts of this case. 
Finally, the State asserted that the defendant's demeanor 
of calmness equated to intent (T. 856). For the very same reasons 
espoused in Bolsinger, such assertions are groundless. The 
testimony on demeanor evidence reflected post-death behavior and in 
no way sheds light on the mental state possessed by Mr. Sampson at 
the time of Miyako's death. 
Mr. Sampson urges this Court to vacate the conviction of 
Second Degree Homicide and either order the charges against him to 
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be dismissed or to impose a conviction for Manslaughter. 
POINT VI. THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY INSTRUCTED 
THE JURY ON THE DEFINITION OF DEPRAVED 
INDIFFERENCE OVER THE OBJECTION OF MR. SAMPSON. 
Mr. Sampson requested, in turn, two different 
instructions on depraved indifference murder (R. 235, 246-47). The 
trial court refused both instructions choosing instead to adopt the 
instruction prepared by the State (T. 921-22). Mr. Sampson excepted 
to the instruction given by the court claiming it did not adequately 
guide the jurors nor take into account prior case law (T. 921-924). 
The State responded that instructions Nos. 25 and 27 (R. 305 and 
307, respectively) correctly stated the law (T. 926). Mr. Sampson 
continues to urge he was prejudiced by the court's choice of 
instructions. 
The Utah Supreme Court has addressed the question of 
instructing jurors on the definition of depraved indifference in 
several key cases. State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 254 (Utah 1988); 
State v. Bolsinger, 699 P.2d 1214 (Utah 1985); and State v. Fontana, 
680 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1984). Mr. Sampson relied on Bolsinger and 
Fontana to prepare, in turn, two different instructions gaged to 
instruct the jury in accordance with the law. Standiford appeared 
after this case but indicates that Mr. Sampson was more attuned to 
the critical concerns in this otherwise nebulous area. 
Mr. Sampson claims that his first instruction (R. 235; 
see Addendum B) more closely focused on the five areas espoused as 
appropriate in Standiford: 
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In sum, the jury should be instructed that to 
convict of depraved murder it must find (1) that 
the defendant acted knowingly (2) in creating a 
grave risk of death, (3) that the defendant knew 
the risk of death was grave, (4) which means 
highly likely probability of death, and (5) that 
the conduct evidenced an utter callousness and 
indifference toward human life. 
769 P.2d at 264. The defense's second proffered instruction and the 
State's choice (R. 247 and Addendum C; R. 307 and Addendum D; 
respectively) fall shorter of meeting the requirements of Standiford, 
Specifically, Mr. Sampson is concerned with point (5) of 
Standiford and the failure of the given instruction to adequately 
guide the jury regarding the intensity of the conduct. The first 
instruction (R. 235) included the key phrases missing from the given 
instructions: 
[T]here must be a knowing doing of an uncalled for 
act in callous disregard of its likely harmful 
effect which is so heinous as to be equivalent to 
a "specific intent" to kill. 
Examples followed that language. See Addendum B. 
Notably, the jurors had difficulty in deliberating about 
depraved indifference, and they inquired of the court to clarify the 
language of its instruction; the court refused to do so (R. 322). 
Had the initially requested instruction been given, the jurors would 
have had the guidance the court failed to give them. Mr. Sampson 
urges that the lack of guidance prejudiced his right to a fair 
trial. As noted in Standiford, "Certainly the difference in law 
between a substantial risk of death and a grave risk of death should 
be explained to a jury in meaningful and understandable terms." 7 69 
P.2d at 263 (emphasis added). Mr. Sampson asserts that the trial 
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court's failure to clearly instruct the jury as he had requested, 
and then later clarify the instruction, mandates reversal of his 
conviction. 
Mr. Sampsonfs position is buttressed by erroneous 
language contained in instruction No. 25 which was relied on by the 
State to fully inform the jury on the law of depraved indifference 
(T. 926). That instruction (R. 305; see Addendum E) concluded with 
language which instructed the jurors that they could not consider 
Manslaughter as an alternative verdict until after resolving in 
their minds the viability of the Second Degree Homicide charge. In 
State v. Gardner, 101 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 9 (Utah 1/31/89), the Utah 
Supreme Court disapproved of this type of an instruction. In 
Gardner, no error was found because the instruction was oral rather 
than written and because other instructions cured the confusion. 
Id. On these facts, however, written instruction No. 25 exacerbated 
the already confusing and inadequate instructions on depraved murder 
such that Mr. Sampson was denied substantial rights. He, 
accordingly, urges reversal of his conviction. 
POINT VII: THE MISCONDUCT OF THE PROSECUTORS 
PREJUDICED MR. SAMPSON AND DENIED HIM HIS 
CONSTITUTIONALLY GUARANTEED RIGHTS TO A FAIR TRIAL. 
Both the state and federal constitutions guarantee 
Mr. Sampson, as they do any accused, the fundamental right to a fair 
trial. Fourteenth amendment, United States Constitution; Article I, 
Sections 7 and 12, Utah Constitution. In conformity with those 
rights, prosecutors have as much of a duty to ensure the defendant 
- 67 -
receives a fair trial as they do to win cases. The Utah Supreme 
Court has noted: 
We have previously stated that the State while 
charged with vigorously enforcing the laws has a 
duty to not only secure appropriate convictions, 
but an even higher duty to see that justice is 
done. In his role as the State's representative 
in criminal matters the prosecutor, therefore, 
must not only attempt to win cases, but must see 
that justice is done. Thus, while he should 
prosecute with earnestness and vigor, it is as 
much his duty to refrain from improper methods 
calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it 
is to use every legitimate means to bring about a 
just one. 
Walker v. State, 624 P.2d 687, 691 (Utah 1981) (quotations and 
citations omitted). 
A corresponding and long-standing precept of 
Anglo-American jurisprudence insists that prosecutors not employ 
arguments calculated to inflame the passions or prejudices of the 
jury, nor direct the jury from its duty to decide the case on 
anything other than the evidence before them. Berger v. United 
States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935); see also ABA Standards of Criminal 
Justice 3-5.8(c and d), 3-6.1(3) (2nd ed. 1980); Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct, Rule 3.4(e); and Code of Professional 
Responsibility, DR7-106(c)(7). 
In this case, the prosecutors violated the above tenets, 
thereby sacrificing Mr. Sampson's rights to a fair trial as 
constitutionally guaranteed him. Specifically, prosecutors 
prejudiced the rights of Mr. Sampson by engendering an atmosphere of 
prejudice against him and by inflaming the jury's passions and 
prejudices when they (1) introduced testimony regarding an odor of 
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death and persisted with that testimony after objections had been 
made and sustained; (2) introduced testimony of the morgue-scene 
identification of Miyako by the mother, obtained a stipulation to 
that issue, and again returned to question officers present at the 
morgue for a description of the mother's reaction; (3) displayed 
photographs to the jurors before they were admitted and after 
warnings from the court to avoid publishing those particular 
photographs to jurors pending a ruling on their admissibility; and 
(4) misstated the law and critical facts in closing arguments. 
The standard for reversing a conviction because of 
prosecutorial misconduct propounded by the Supreme Court of Utah is 
two-pronged. The Court has stated: 
The test of whether the remarks made by counsel 
are so objectionable as to merit reversal in a 
criminal case is [1] that the remarks called to 
the attention of the jurors matters which they 
would not be justified in considering in 
determining their verdict, and [2] were [the 
jurors], under the circumstances of the particular 
case, probably influenced by those remarks. 
State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984) (citing, inter alia, 
State v. Valdez, 513 P.2d 422, 426 (Utah 1973)). Applying this 
standard to Mr. Sampson's case demonstrates the prosecutor's 
misconduct requires reversal of his conviction. 
A. ODOR OF DEATH TESTIMONY 
During direct examination of the State's "critical" 
witness, Curtis Owens, the following colloquy occurred: 
Q Did you have occasion to later come down to 
the hall in connection with an odor that you had 
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perceived? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q And can you tell the jury when that would 
have been in relation to what you've just 
described? 
A Well, it had to have been after that 'cause I 
went out to get, hum, to the ice box again. And 
then I smelled this odor. And I went in there and 
told him to take the diapers outside because they 
were smelling up the house. 
Q Can you describe what the odor that you 
smelled was like? 
A Very harsh odor. 
Q Is there anything else notable about the odor 
that you smelled? 
A It wasn't a diaper smell. 
Q What kind of smell was it? 
A It would be hard to describe other than it 
was just that I've smelled it before. 
Q When have you smelled that odor before? 
A When my friend was shot. 
Q An odor of death? 
MR. VALDEZ: Objection, your Honor. 
JUDGE YOUNG: Sustained. 
Q (by Ms. Lewis) It was an odor that you 
associated with death, Mr. Owens? 
A If you like to have it like that, yeah. 
MR. VALDEZ: Objection to that answer. 
JUDGE YOUNG: Sustained. The answer will be 
stricken. Unless there's an adequate foundation 
as to what constitutes an odor of death the court 
will instruct you not to refer to that in any 
further questioning. I think that's inappropriate 
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and can be misinterpreted by the jury. 
And I will request that the jury please 
ignore any references to that. That's certainly' 
not an exact basis upon which a judgment can be 
rendered. 
MS. LEWIS: Thank you, your Honor. 
Q (by Ms. Lewis) After smelling the odor that 
you've described what occurred next? 
A I went in my room. (T. 189-91). 
After the completion of cross-examination, Mr. Sampson moved for a 
mistrial (T. 217). That motion was denied by the court (T. 219). 
However, in part, the court ruled that "an odor of death is 
speculative and without foundation or basis." The court further 
ruled that he thought his discussion with the jury cured any 
problem. See Addendum F for discussion of the motion by the parties 
and the court's ruling. 
Nonetheless, despite the ruling of the court, the 
prosecutor returned to this odor-of-death theme with the medical 
examiner. 
Q [Ms. Lewis] Dr. Grey, what olfactory 
indicators of death might one be aware of— 
MS. BOWMAN: I am going to object without further 
foundation. 
JUDGE YOUNG: The objection on olfactory? You are 
talking about smell? 
MS. LEWIS: Yes, your Honor. 
JUDGE YOUNG: What further foundation do you 
need? I don't understand your objection on that. 
MS. BOWMAN: Can we approach the bench? 
JUDGE YOUNG: You may. You better. 
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(Whereupon, a discussion between court and counsel 
was held at the bench, after which, the following 
proceedings were had): 
JUDGE YOUNG: After the discussion at the bench 
the prosecutor has determined to withdraw the 
question. (T. 582). 
Notably, in closing argument, the prosecutor slightly toned down the 
odor from odor of death to "a harsh, strong odor, his words, an odor 
that he said he had only smelled one other time when in the presence 
of a friend who was shot" (T. 853). This statement was followed 
immediately by the description of the then viewed motionless child 
(T. 853). The intended point of the prosecutor was missed by no one. 
While conceding that the death of Miyako was never at 
issue in this case, Mr. Sampson urges that this court should avoid 
assessing these comments under the rubric of harmless error. 
Rather, Mr. Sampson insists that the prosecutorfs dealings with the 
odor-of-death testimony in the context of this case served no 
purpose other than to inflame the passions and prejudices of the 
jurors against Mr. Sampson such that his right to a fair trial by 
impartial jurors was denied. The testimony meets both prongs of the 
Troy standard, requiring reversal. 
B. MORGUE-SCENE TESTIMONY 
During the direct examination of Miyako's mother, 
Antoinette Matthews, the following exchanges occurred: 
Q [Ms. Knight-Eagan]: Did there come a point 
in time where they took you someplace from the 
police station? 
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A [Antoinette Matthews]: Yes. 
Q Do you remember—do you have any idea when 
that was, Antoinette? 
A I think about 3:00. 
Q And where did they take you? 
A We went to TLC Day Care and they picked up a 
friend of mine. 
Q Who was that? 
A Phyllis. 
Q And once Phyllis was picked up what did the 
officers tell you? 
A They were driving and we went past the police 
station and we kept driving down 4th South. And 
he says, we found some clothes and a body and we 
want you to look at the body. 
Q What was your response? 
A And I said, well, where did you find the 
body, you know? How did you find it? And he 
said, leads. 
Q What else did you tell him? 
A And I said, no, it's not my daughter. It's 
not her. 
Q Where did they take you? 
A To the medical examiners at the University. 
Q What happened there? 
A We walked in and I was sitting—a guy says, 
sit down and he rolled this table out. And I 
could see, I could see the head and I could see 
all the squares. 
Q In her hair? 
A In her hair. 
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MR. VALDEZ: Your Honor, we will stipulate to the 
identification. I don't see any reason to drag 
her through this grief. 
JUDGE YOUNG: I think — 
MR. VALDEZ: And possibly inflame the jury. 
JUDGE YOUNG: Well, I'm not sure that it's going 
to inflame the jury, it's a fact of what happened 
in the events, but I think it probably is beyond 
the scope of what needs to be done. They will 
stipulate— 
MS. KNIGHT-EAGAN: If they will stipulate — 
JUDGE YOUNG: That she identified the child. 
MR. VALDEZ: Certainly. 
MS. KNIGHT-EAGAN: Then that's fine, your Honor, 
otherwise I think it's something we do need to 
establish. 
JUDGE YOUNG: They have stipulated. 
MS. KNIGHT-EAGAN: So the stipulation will be that 
the child that Antoinette identified at the 
medical examiners was Miyako Sampson? 
MR. VALDEZ: Yes. 
MS. BOWMAN: Yes. 
JUDGE YOUNG: All right. 
Q (by Ms. Knight-Eagan) Antoinette, would you 
describe your relationship with your daughter? 
A We were—everywhere I went she went. 
Q Did you breast feed her? 
A I breast— 
MR. VALDEZ: Your Honor, I am going to object as 
to relevance. 
JUDGE YOUNG: Sustained. 
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MS. KNIGHT-EAGAN: Your Honor, may we approach the 
bench on that point? 
JUDGE YOUNG: You may. 
(Whereupon, a discussion between the court and 
counsel was held at the bench, after which, the 
following proceedings were had): 
JUDGE YOUNG: Following the conference at the 
bench the court sustains the objection. 
MS. KNIGHT-EAGAN: Your Honor, I have no further 
questions at this time. (T. 75-77). 
Later in the trial during the direct examination of Officer Syd 
Elliott, the prosecutor returned to the morgue-scene theme 
ultimately inquiring: 
Q [Ms. Lewis] What happened after you arrived 
at the medical examiners office? 
MR. VALDEZ: Your Honor, stipulate she I.D.'d the 
child. I think we've been through this before. 
MS. LEWIS: Well, your Honor, I'd like to ask this 
in a question and answer format, if I may. I 
think the jury is entitled to know what this man 
observed in terms of the mother of the victim's 
response when she saw the body of this child. 
JUDGE YOUNG: Well, are you talking about a 
demeanor response? 
MS. LEWIS: Yes, your Honor. 
JUDGE YOUNG: All right. Well, the objection is 
overruled. 
Q (by Ms. Lewis) What happened when you 
arrived at the medical examiner's office? 
A [Officer Elliott:] The child was brought 
into the foyer or the lobby of the medical 
examiner's office and the mother did identify the 
child. 
Q Could you describe for the jury her demeanor 
at the time upon seeing the child? 
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A She was extremely emotionally upset, 
hysterically crying, sobbing and her knees buckled. 
MS. LEWIS: Thank you. Nothing further. 
(T. 347-48) 
Notably, the prosecutor returned yet one more time to 
discuss the mother's demeanor upon viewing her dead child at the 
morgue during closing argument when the prosecutor supplicated the 
jurors: 
As [Antoinette] left the child [with Carlos at his 
apartment, Miyako] began to cry. The child 
followed her out, grabbed at her leg crying. This 
was the last time she saw the child. You will 
remember—I should correct that. That's the last 
time she saw the child alive. 
She also testified she saw the child at the 
medical examiner's office. And I would ask you to 
remember her demeanor in that regard and how 
difficult it was for her, how difficult it was for 
her throughout to identify the property of the 
little child and the personal effects that the 
baby was wearing the day this occurred. (T. 851) 
As with the odor-of-death testimony in subpoint A, the 
morgue-scene testimony (and whether Miyako was breast-fed) is 
irrelevant to the determinations at issue in this case. The 
prosecution had already established that Miyako was dead and that 
she was Antoinette's daughter (T. 57). Even if relevant, the 
defense had already stipulated to the morgue-scene identification of 
Miyako by her mother. The subsequent questions and answers served 
no legitimate purpose other than to inflame the jury's passions and 
prejudices against Mr. Sampson. Such tactics are prosecutor 
misconduct and on these facts require reversal of Mr. Sampson's 
conviction. State v. Troy, 688 P.2d at 486-87. 
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C. PREPUBLISHING PHOTOGRAPHS TO THE JURY 
The defense filed a motion in limine to exclude 
prejudicial photographs including State's exhibits 10 and 11. While 
the trial court had ruled on most of the photographs, he reserved 
ruling on numbers 10 and 11 until he could determine if the proper 
foundation could be laid for their admission. When Dr. Palmer was 
testifying, he showed a photograph (No. 20) to the jury which had 
not been admitted. The court cautioned Dr. Palmer not to show 
photographs to the jury until they were admitted (T. 392). 
Later when Lieutenant Forbes was testifying, the court 
interrupted and indicated: 
Let me state in relation to the next two exhibits 
[State's 10 and 11], please don't publish those to 
the jury at this point. You may lay a foundation 
to those two exhibits with this witness but as to 
their unique relevance which has been discussed in 
chambers, until that foundation is laid I do not 
want those exhibits published to the jury. 
(T. 453). 
The prosecutor then continued her examination of the lieutenant, 
terminating her direct examination (T. 453-55). Following a recess, 
the prosecutor asked leave to ask two more questions of the 
lieutenant; the court granted that request (T. 456). The following 
events and discussion then occurred: 
MS. LEWIS: I have just two more questions for 
Lieutenant Forbes, your Honor. 
JUDGE YOUNG: Prior to cross-examination you may 
ask those questions. 
MS. LEWIS: Thank you. 
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Q (by Ms. Lewis) Lieutenant Forbes, with 
reference to photographic exhibit No. 1 1 — 
MS. BOWMAN: Your Honor— 
JUDGE YOUNG: Counsel, I would appreciate it if 
you would pick those up carefully. 
MS. LEWIS: I did pick them up carefully, your 
Honor. 
JUDGE YOUNG: No, you didn't. And thatfs exactly 
why the objection was coming. 
Q (by Ms. Lewis) With reference to 
photographic exhibits 10 and 11, Lieutenant 
Forbes, do you recall, without looking at the 
photographs, what they depict? 
A Yes, I do. 
Q And could you tell the jury what is depicted 
on those two photographic exhibits? 
A Both of those photographs depict the child 
after it was removed from the garbage sack. 
(T. 456). 
Later, out of the presence of the jury, the defense requested the 
benefit of the record to better preserve what had occurred. That 
discussion is enclosed in its entirety at Addendum G. Basically, 
the defense suggested that despite the cautions from the judge, the 
prosecutor picked up the critical photographs displaying the picture 
side to members of the jury (T. 528-29). The prosecutor disputed 
that analysis claiming she did not display the picture side and made 
an effort not to do so (T. 529). The court then clarified what 
occurred indicating: 
[W]hen you [Ms. Lewis,] picked up those pictures 
here at the table that you picked up the picture, 
bringing the front of the picture to your front 
and it was held at your side, and at least in my 
opinion, four of the jurors had a direct view of 
that. And you then turned it back to the back. 
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It was at that point that Ms. Bowman stood up and 
began her objection. It was at that point I 
interrupted her and told her that I anticipated 
the objection she was making and I had observed 
the conduct that you had in relation to the 
picture. (T. 530-31). 
The court then went on to indicate he believed that photographs 10 
and 11 would be admitted and that the conduct did not prejudice 
Mr. Sampson and, in any event, would be cured upon admission as 
exhibits (T. 531). 
Importantly, Mr. Sampson maintained a continuing 
objection to the admission of various photographs including numbers 
10 and 11. He now asserts on appeal that the ultimate admission of 
those photographs was reversible error. See Point III, supra. 
However, regardless of this Court's ruling on the propriety of the 
photographs as exhibits, Mr. Sampson urges that this Court find the 
prosecutor's behavior to be misconduct requiring reversal of his 
conviction. 
Applying the Troy standard to the occurrence claimed as 
error herein is not without difficulty. While the first prong is 
inarguably met in light of the trial court's repeated cautionings to 
not disclose photographs prior to admission, particularly numbers 10 
and 11, the second prong—whether the jurors were influenced— 
requires deeper analysis. Mr. Sampson urges that the State's 
behavior should be the focus as much as the photographs themselves. 
Mr. Sampson claims that the State's methodology in prosecuting this 
case in general, and specifically illustrated by these events, as 
much or more than the photographs themselves, influenced the jurors 
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to ultimately return an improper verdict of guilty on the Second 
Degree Homicide charge. 
[A prosecutor] may prosecute with earnestness and 
vigor—indeed he should do so. But while he may 
strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike 
foul ones. It is . . . his duty to refrain from 
improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful 
conviction. 
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
D. MISSTATEMENTS OF LAW AND FACT DURING CLOSING 
ARGUMENT 
During closing arguments, the prosecutor misstated 
critical facts and misstated critical points of the law. Such 
errors meet the State v. Troy two-prong test and require reversal of 
Mr. Sampson's conviction. 
The prosecutor referenced testimony which had been 
objected to and sustained. She urged, as very telling and 
indicative of Mr. Sampson's intent to kill Miyako, a statement that 
Antoinette had testified to earlier in the trial. Antoinette had 
stated that following their last argument Mr. Sampson "was smiling 
and laughing like the joke's on you" (T. 120). That statement was 
objected to as conclusory and the objection was sustained (T. 121). 
Yet, the prosecutor in closing stated: 
And [Antoinette's] words were, he smiled as if the 
joke's on you. And ladies and gentlemen of the 
jury, that's a telling remark. And that becomes 
extremely important because it is the State's 
position that at that point in time the defendant 
stated what his intent was . . . His demeanor was 
suggestive that the man had a plan (T. 850-51). 
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The prosecutor misstated key facts when she told jurors 
that Carlos Sampson had told both of the 7-Eleven clerks that 
"something" was stolen from his truck, as opposed to "his child" 
(T. 855). Examining the testimony correctly establishes that the 
testimony of Tina Wilcken and Stewart Simper indicates that 
Mr. Sampson had stated "his little girl" was stolen (T. 245, 251). 
The prosecutor misled the jury by critically misstating 
the law regarding manslaughter. She argued against a finding of 
extreme emotional disturbance in part because Mr. Sampson "did not 
believe he was defending himself" (T. 914). The defense objected 
(T. 914), and the prosecutor's statement was sanctioned as correct 
when the trial court overruled that objection (T. 914). 
The prosecutor erroneously instructed jurors that, if the 
defendant intended his conduct rather than the result, he should be 
found guilty of Second Degree Homicide (T. 916). An objection 
followed the comment, and the judge identified the pertinent 
instructions (T. 916-17). 
The prosecutor told jurors that their key witness, Curtis 
Owens, received no deal from the State in exchange for his testimony 
(T. 918) when he actually indicated that he received a promise from 
the prosecutors to write a letter containing a favorable 
recommendation to the courts in Nevada (T. 201). That letter was 
significant because a new extortion conviction from Utah County in 
1987 jeopardized Mr. Owens' probationary status in the Nevada system 
for a prior Attempted Burglary charge (T. 206, 215-16). In fact, 
the State was withholding that letter until after his testimony in 
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this case, further mischaracterizing the claim that no deals were 
struck in exchange for his testimony (T. 123). The prosecutor's 
closing argument on this point was misleading and wrong. 
Finally, the prosecutor repeatedly interjected her own 
opinion on the evidence and the guilt of Mr. Sampson. See 
Addendum H for a short list of the more egregious comments 
personalized by the prosecutor. Notably, the United States Supreme 
Court has indicated that a prosecutor's personal opinion as to the 
guilt of a defendant is irrelevant and improper to convey to the 
jury. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1 (1985). The Young Court 
cited to the American Bar Association's Standing Committee on 
Standards for Criminal Justice which had promulgated the following: 
It is unprofessional conduct for the prosecutor to 
express his or her personal opinion as to the 
truth or falsity of any testimony or evidence or 
the guilt of the defendant. 
Id. at 6 (citing ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 3-5.8(b) (2nd 
ed. 1980)). 
The prosecutor in Young indicated he thought the 
defendant committed fraud and that he, the prosecutor, did not 
believe the defendant acted with honor and integrity. 3[cL at 6. 
The Court found these statements to be error and indicated the 
concern over such misconduct by explaining that: 
[t]he prosecutor's vouching for the credibility of 
witnesses and expressing his personal opinion 
concerning the guilt of the accused pose two 
dangers: such comments can convey the impression 
that evidence not presented to the jury, but known 
to the prosecutor, supports the charges against 
the defendant and can thus jeopardize the 
defendant's right to be tried solely on the basis 
of the evidence presented to the jury; and the 
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prosecutorfs opinion carries with it the 
imprimatur of the Government and may induce the 
jury to trust the Government's judgment rather 
than its own view of the evidence. 
Id. at 18 (citing Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. at 88-89). 
In Young, the Court found the error to be non-reversible 
primarily because the prosecutor had responded with the challenged 
remarks in response, or by invitation, to the defense attorneyfs 
closing argument which proceeded his rebuttal. Such a redemption is 
unavailable in this case as most of the prosecutor's 
personalizations appeared in her closing argument proper, and not 
her rebuttal. 
For the reasons outlined above, Mr. Sampson urges that 
the prosecutor's behavior meets the Troy standard because it was 
improper and likely influenced the verdict. Further, he insists 
that the error cannot be held harmless because this case is a very 
close case—see Points V and VI, supra—and even a minute error 
could have been utilized to tip the balance in favor of a guilty 
verdict on the Second Degree Homicide charge rather than the 
Manslaughter charge. His conviction, therefore, should be reversed. 
POINT VIII. CUMULATIVE ERRORS OCCURRING IN THIS 
CASE DENIED MR. SAMPSON HIS RIGHTS TO A FAIR TRIAL. 
If this Court fails to reverse his conviction on the 
individual errors claimed herein, Mr. Sampson urges that the 
cumulative effect of the errors certainly worked prejudice in 
denying him a fair trial. See Gooden v. State, 617 P.2d 248, 250 
(Okla. Crim. App. 1980), wherein the court noted, 
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[W]hen a review of the entire record reveals 
numerous irregularities that tend to prejudice the 
rights of a defendant and where an accumulation of 
errors denies a defendant a fair trial, the case 
will be reversed, even though one of the errors, 
standing alone, would not be ample to justify 
reversal. 
The prejudice from the errors in this case cannot be quantified. No 
juror could have sufficiently distanced himself or herself from the 
improper influences in this case. The conviction of Mr. Sampson 
must be reversed and a new trial ordered. 
CONCLUSION 
For all or any of the foregoing reasons, Appellant 
Carlos R. Sampson respectfully requests that this Court reverse his 
conviction and remand the case for a new trial or, alternatively, 
impose a judgment against him for Manslaughter. 
Respectfully submitted this day of June, 1989. 
^ l-v\, 
ANDREW A. VALDEZ 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant y 
[OHARD G. UDAi 
Attorney for Defendai ppellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
77-35-18- Rule 18 — Selection of jury. 
(e) The challenge for cause is an objection to a particular juror and 
may be taken on one or more of the following grounds: 
(13) Having formed or expressed an unqualified opinion or belief as to 
whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty of the offense charged; or 
(14) That a state of mind exists on the part of the juror with reference 
to the cause, or to either party, which will prevent him from acting impar-
tially and without prejudice to the substantial rights of the party challeng-
ing; but no person shall be disqualified as a juror by reason of having 
formed or expressed an opinion upon the matter or cause to be submitted 
to such jury, founded upon public rumor, statements in public journals or 
common notoriety, if it satisfactorily appears to the court that the juror 
can and will, notwithstanding such opinion, act impartially and fairly upon 
the matter to be submitted to him. 
ADDENDUM B 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Depraved indifference refers not to mental gtate but to the 
objective circumstances under which the conduct causing the death 
occurred. Reckless conduct which has an incidental tragic result 
will not suffice. At the time of the act, the defendant must know 
of the risk. Knowledge here refers to the nature of the conduct or 
the circumstances surrounding it or both but not the result produced 
by the conduct. The circumstances of the death when objectively 
viewed must evidence a depraved indifference to human life and 
thereby cause an unlawful death. In other words, there must be a 
knowing doing of an uncalled for act in callous disregard of its 
likely harmful effect which is so heinous as to be equivalent to a 
"specific intent" to kill. Examples of this might be unmitigated 




I have previously used the term "depraved indifference" in 
these instructions. The term is not specifically defined by 
statute. Thusf the phrase "depraved indifference" is a concept 
which must be left largely to the experience and common sense of the 
jury. Depraved indifference refers not to a mental state but to the 
objective circumstances under which the conduct causing the death 
occurred. 
To engage in conduct with a "depraved indifference to human 
life," a person must do more than act "recklessly," even if the 
reckless conduct has an incidental tragic result. He need not have 
as his conscious objective the desire to cause the result; not need 
he be aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the 
result. However, the person must know that his conduct or the 
circumstances surrounding it or both created a grave risk of death 
to another. 
The greatness of the risk which the defendant's actions 
create and the lack of justification for the creation of the risk is 
the test to be applied in determining whether the defendant's 
conduct evidences a "depraved indifference to human life." 
In determining whether the defendant acted with depraved 
indifference, the circumstances under which the defendant acted are 
to be viewed objectively from the standpoint of a reasonable person 
and not subjectively by the actual state of the defendant's mind. 
ADDENDUM D 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
I have previously used the term "depraved 
indif ference" in these instructions. The term is not 
specifically defined by statute. Thus, the phrase "depraved 
indifference" is a concept which must be left largely to the 
experience and common sense of the jury. 
To engage in conduct with a "depraved indifference to 
human life,11 a person must do more than act "recklessly," but 
he need not have as his conscious objective or desire to cause 
the result; nor need he be aware that his conduct is reasonably 
certain to cause the result. However, the person must be aware 
that his conduct created a grave risk of death to another. 
The greatness of the risk which the defendants 
actions create and the lack of justification for the creation 
of the risk is the test to be applied in determining whether 
the defendant's conduct evidences a "depraved indifference to 
human life." 
In determining whether the defendant acted with 
depraved indifference, the circumstances under which the 
defendant acted are to be viewed objectively from the 
standpoint of a reasonable person and not subjectively by the 
actual state of the defendant's mind. 
^W^*>0 f\*1 
ADDENDUM E 
INSTRUCTION NO. ? 
Before you can convict the defendant, Carlos R. Sampson, of 
the crime of Criminal Homicide, Murder in the Second Degree, a 
First Degree Felony, as charged in the Information on file in 
this case, you must find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, all of the following elements of that offense: 
1. That on or about the 24th day of November, 1986, the 
defendant, Carlos R. Sampson, caused the death of Miyako Sampson; 
and 
2. That he did so intentionally or knowingly; or 
3. That, intending to cause serious bodily injury to 
Miyako Sampson, he committed an act clearly dangerous to human 
life that caused the death of Miyako Sampson; or 
4. That, acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved 
indifference to human life, he knowingly engaged in conduct which 
created a grave risk of death to another and thereby caused the 
death of Miyako Sampson. 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and all of 
the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, 
it is your duty to convict the defendant, Carlos R. Sampson, of 
Criminal Homicide, Murder in the Second Degree. If the evidence 
has failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt one or more of 
the said elements, then you cannot find him guilty of that 
offense and you may then consider whether the defendant is guilty 




 JUDGE YOUNG: YOU MAY STEP DOWN, MR. OWENS, 
2 THANK YOU FOR YOUR FESFIMONY. 
3 MS. LEWIS: YOUR HONOR, MAY FHIS WIFNESS BE 
4 EXCUSED AT THIS FIME? 
5 JUDGE YOUNG: ANY OBJECFION? 
6 MR. VALDEZ: NO OBJECFION, BUF WE'D LIKE HIM 
7 BACK TOMORROW IN FHE EVENF FHAF WE'D LIKE FO CALL HIM BACK. 
8 MS. LEWIS: YOUR HONOR — 
9 JUDGE YOUNG: IN FHAF EVENF FHEN HE'S NOF EXCUSED 
10 HETS EXCUSED TODAY BUF HE'S SUBJECF FO SUBPOENA. 
11 WOULD YOU BE AVAILABLE AGAIN TOMORROW, MR. OWENS? 
12 THE WITNESS: I GOF A JOB FO GO FO. 
13 MR, VALDEZ: YOUR HONOR, WE DON' F WANF HIM 
14 PERMANENTLY EXCUSED AT FHIS FIME. 
15 JUDGE YOUNG: HE'S NOF EXCUSED SUBJECT TO 
16 SUBPOENA. 
17 COURF WILL BE IN RECESS. 
18 (RECESS) . 
19 
20 JUDGE YOUNG: DURING FHE RECESS COUNSEL HAS 
21 REQUESTED THAT FHERE'S A MAFFER THEY'D LIKE TO FAKE UP WITH 
22 FHE COURF OUTSIDE FHE PRESENCE OF THE JURY. 
23 THE RECORD MAY SHOW FHAF WE ARE CONVENED NOW 
24 IN COURT WITHOUT THE JURY PRESENT. 
25 MS. BOWMAN: YES, YOUR HONOR. AND FHAF MOTION 
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1 IS WE ARE MOVING FOR A MISTRIAL BASED UPON THE PROSECUTOR'S 
2 QUESTION PUT TO CURTIS OWENS WHICH WAS OBJECTED TO 
3 IMMEDIATELY REGARDING WAS THE ODOR CHARACTERIZED AS SOME-
4 THING LIKE AN ODOR OF DEATH. THERE WAS AN OBJECTION MADE 
5 IMMEDIATELY. YOU ADMONISHED THE JURY, I BELIEVE, THAT THE 
6 REMARK WILL BE STRICKEN BUT, NONETHELESS, THE JURY HEARD 
1 IT. WE KNOW THEY CAN'T CANCEL THAT OUT OF THEIR MIND AND 
8 ANY ADMONISHMENT IS NOT GOING TO ERASE ANY EFFECT. AND 
9 IT?S SO PREJUDICIAL AND WITHOUT ADEQUATE FOUNDATION ON THE 
10 FACTS THAT WE ARE MOVING FOR A MISTRIAL AT THIS POINT. 
11 MS. LEWIS: IF I MIGHT JUST ADDRESS THAT, YOUR 
12 HONOR? AS THE COURT WILL RECALL, THAT STATEMENT OR QUES-
13 TION ABOUT THE ODOR OF DEATH HAD BEEN IMMEDIATELY PRECEDED 
14 BY A STATEMENT FROM THE WITNESS WHEN HE WAS ASKED TO 
15 DESCRIBE WHAT ODOR. HE INDICATED THAT IT WAS AN ODOR LIKE 
16 AN ODOR HE HAD SMELLED WHEN A FRIEND OF HIS HAD BEEN SHOT. 
17 THERE WAS NO OBJECTION TO THAT QUESTION OR THAT ANSWER. 
18 AND THE LEADING QUESTION, WAS THIS AN ODOR OF DEATH, WAS 
19 A FOLLOW-UP ON THIS. THE ONLY THING THAT MAY HAVE BEEN 
20 OBJECTIONABLE ABOUT THAT PARTICULAR QUESTION WAS THE LEADING 
21 NATURE. AND I DON'T THINK THERE'S ANYONE IN THIS COURT-
22 ROOM WHO WOULD NOT ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THIS WAS A HOSTILE 
23 WITNESS, AT BEST, AND I THINK THAT IT IS CLEAR THAT WITH 
24 THE HOSTILE WITNESS A LEADING QUESTION IS PERMISSIBLE. 
25 AND IF THERE WAS A PROBLEM WITH THE QUESTION 
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1 I BELIEVE THE COURT CURED THAT PROBLEM BY ITS PROMPT, CLEAR 
2 ADMONISHMENT TO THE JURY AND REQUEST THAT THE ANSWER BE 
3 STRICKEN AND THE JURY DISREGARD IT. 
4 THAT WOULD BE OUR RESPONSE. 
5 JUDGE YOUNG: THANK YOU. 
6 MS. BOWMAN: IN RESPONSE TO THAT WE INDICATE 
7 THEY CALLED HIM AS THEIR WITNESS, THEY KNEW WHAT HIS PERSON-
8 ALITY IS LIKE, AND HE IS NOT A HOSTILE WITNESS. HE'S 
9 TESTIFYING. HE'S NOT HOSTILE TO THEM. HE WAS TESTIFYING 
10 FOR THEM. HE IS A LITTLE UNRULY BUT NOT HOSTILE. AND I 
11 THINK THAT IF THE PROSECUTOR HAD STOPPED WITH THE RESPONSE, 
12 WITH MR. OWENS1 RESPONSE, THAT IT WAS SIMILAR TO AN ODOR 
13 THAT HE SMELLED WHEN A FRIEND WAS SHOT, FINE, BUT THE 
14 PROSECUTOR ASKED ONE MORE QUESTION. THAT QUESTION WAS VERY, 
15 VERY PURPOSEFUL. 
16 JUDGE YOUNG ALL RIGHT. THE COURT'S HEARD YOUR 
17 ARGUMENT IN RELATION TO THE MISTRIAL. THE QUESTION AS TO 
18 WHAT AN ODOR OF DEATH REALLY IS IS SO SPECULATIVE AS TO 
19 ANYONE'S CONCLUSION AS TO WHAT IT MIGHT BE—THERE'S NO 
20 FOUNDATION OR BASIS FOR IT. I THINK THE COURT TOOK CARE 
21 OF THE OBJECTIONABLE PHRASE IN DISCUSSION WITH THE JURY. 
22 YOUR MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL IS DENIED. 
23 MS. BOWMAN: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
24 MR. VALDEZ: THANK YOU. 




























NOON RECESS IF YOU TAKE THAT OPPORTUNITY AND REVIEW THE 
SLIDES IN THE EVENT THAT THERE ARE ADDITIONAL SLIDES TO THOSE 
THAT HAVE BEEN REPRODUCED INTO A PHOTOGRAPH. 
WE WILL EXCUSE THE JURY FOR LUNCH. WE WILL RETURN 
AT 2:00 O'CLOCK. PLEASE REMEMBER MY PREVIOUS ADMONITIONS. 
(WHEREUPON, THE JURY LEAVES THE COURTROOM). 
MS. BOWMAN: YOUR HONOR, WE ALSO HAVE A MATTER. 
JUST TO PRESERVE THE RECORD WE'D LIKE TO HAVE THE RECORD 
REFLECT EXACTLY WHAT HAPPENED WITH THE PROSECUTOR'S CONDUCT 
YESTERDAY REGARDING THE PHOTOGRAPH AND THE DANGER THAT THE 
JURY POSSIBLY SAW THAT AND YOUR ADMONISHMENT TO THE STATE 
REGARDING THAT. WE WANT THAT TO BE CLEAR IN THE RECORD 
EXACTLY WHAT HAPPENED. 
JUDGE YOUNG: DO YOU DESIRE TO STATE ANY MORE 
IN RELATION TO IT? 
MS. BOWMAN: I THINK THE RECORD SHOULD REFLECT 
SHE PICKED UP THE PHOTOGRAPH WITH HER BACK TO THE JURY AND 
WITH THE PHOTOGRAPH FACING HER ANTERIOR SIDE OF HER BODY, 
AND THAT THE JURY POSSIBLY SAW IT AT THAT POINT, AND THEN 
IT WAS SHOWN TO THE WITNESS AND THEN THERE WAS THE ADMONISH-
MENT. 
MS. LEWIS: I WOULD LIKE TO INDICATE I WAS VERY 
CLEARLY ADMONISHED IN THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY AND I THINK 
THE RECORD WAS VERY WELL MADE ON THAT PARTICULAR POINT AND 
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1
 'THAT, I BELIEVE, COUNSEL IS CORRECT IN STATING THAT I WAS 
2
 | BETWEEN THE JURY AND YOUR HONOR AND THAT I HAD MY BACK TO 
THEM AND HAD THE PHOTOGRAPH TOWARD ME WITH THE WHITE PORTION 
OF THE PHOTOGRAPH, THAT IS THE FIBERBOARD, FACING THEM, AND 
THE PICTURE TURNED AWAY. 
MR. VALDEZ: THAT'S NOT CORRECT. 
MS. BOWMAN: MAY THE RECORD REFLECT, THE JURY 
BOX IS CURVED AND YOU PROBABLY CANNOT TURN YOUR BACK TO 
EVERYBODY IN THE JURY. 
MS. LEWIS: I MADE WHAT I PERCEIVED TO BE AN 
11
 I EFFORT, YOUR HONOR, TO SHOW THE PHOTOGRAPH TO NO ONE. I 
*
2
 I DID PICK UP THE PHOTOGRAPH IN ORDER TO LOOK AT THE EXHIBIT 
NUMBER AND ALSO WHAT WAS DEPICTED ON THE OTHER SIDE WITH 
14
 j MY BACK TO THEM AS FAR AWAY FROM THEM, IN FACT, STANDING 
15




















AND I WOULD FURTHER INDICATE, YOUR HONOR, THAT 
MY UNDERSTANDING AS TO THE COURT'S RULING WAS VERY CLEARLY 
THAT WE WERE NOT TO PUBLISH THEM TO THE JURY AT THAT TIME, 
BUT THAT EARLIER IN CHAMBERS, THE COURT HAD INDICATED THAT 
THOSE PARTICULAR TWO PHOTOGRAPHS WOULD, AT SOME POINT, BE 
ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE. 
AND MY UNDERSTANDING FURTHER IS THAT ARGUMENT 
WAS MADE BY BOTH DEFENSE AND PROSECUTION ON THAT PARTICULAR 
POINT BEFORE THAT RULING WAS MADE AND THAT THE COURT VERY 
APPROPRIATELY INDICATED THAT THERE NEEDS TO BE FURTHER 
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1 TIE-UP ON THE MEDICAL BUT THAT ULTIMATELY THOSE EXHIBITS 
2 WOULD BE COMING IN. 
3 JUDGE YOUNG: ANYTHING FURTHER FOR THE RECORD? 
4 MR. VALDEZ: NO. 
5 MS. BOWMAN: NO. 
6 JUDGE YOUNG: THE COURT WILL INDICATE TO YOU, 
7 MS. LEWIS, THAT THE COURT, WHEN THOSE TWO EXHIBITS WERE 
8 PROFFERED EARLIER IN THE TESTIMONY, INDICATED TO YOU THAT 
9 I DESIRED THAT THOSE EXHIBITS BE PROTECTED FROM THE VIEW 
10 OF THE JURY AND THAT THEY BE PROTECTED UNTIL A PROPER 
11 FOUNDATION HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED FOR THEIR IMPORTANCE IN 
12 RELATION TO THE INDIVIDUAL BRUISINGS OF THE CHIN. AND THAT 
13 ONE WAS A LEFT VIEW AND THE OTHER WAS A RIGHT VIEW AND I 
14 DID NOT WANT THEM ADMITTED UNTIL THEY HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED 
15 BY THE DOCTOR TO BE AN IMPORTANT REPRESENTATION FOR HIM TO 
16 EXAMINE IN RELATION TO THE ULTIMATE EXAMINATION OF THE CHILD, 
17 I WILL ALSO INDICATE TO YOU THAT WHEN YOU PICKED 
18 UP THOSE PICTURES HERE AT THE TABLE THAT YOU PICKED UP THE 
19 PICTURE, BRINGING THE FRONT OF THE PICTURE TO YOUR FRONT 
20 AND IT WAS HELD AT YOUR SIDE, AND AT LEAST IN MY OPINION, 
21 FOUR OF THE JURORS HAD A DIRECT VIEW OF THAT. AND YOU THEN 
22 TURNED IT BACK TO THE BACK. IT WAS AT THAT POINT THAT MS. 
23 BOWMAN STOOD UP AND BEGAN HER OBJECTION. IT WAS AT THAT 
24 POINT I INTERRUPTED HER AND TOLD HER THAT I ANTICIPATED THE 


















YOU HAD IN RELATION TO THE PICTURE. 
AND I WANT TO INDICATE AGAIN FOR THE RECORD THAT 
ULTIMATELY IT IS MY IMPRESSION AT THIS POINT THAT THOSE 
PICTURES WILL BE ADMITTED, BUT THAT I HAD INSTRUCTED YOU 
NOT TO SHOW THOSE TO THE JURY UNTIL THEY HAVE HAD AN OPPOR-
TUNITY TO BE APPROPRIATELY ESTABLISHED BY FOUNDATION THAT 
THEY SHOULD HAVE BEEN ADMITTED. IT IS MY VIEW THAT THOSE 
PICTURES WERE CARELESSLY HANDLED IN THIS COURT AND WERE 
REFLECTED TO THE JURY AND I SO INDICATED AT THAT TIME. 
NOW, IT IS ALSO MY VIEW THAT HAVING SO INDICATED, 
THAT I BELIEVE THAT THAT CONDUCT DID NOT PREJUDICE THE JURY 
AND THAT THAT CONDUCT, IF THE PICTURES ARE SUBSEQUENTLY 
RECEIVED AFTER AN APPROPRIATE FOUNDATION, WOULD CLEARLY BE 
CURED BY THE RECEIPT OF THE PICTURES. SO I DO NOT BELIEVE 
THAT THERE WILL BE ULTIMATELY A CONTINUING OBJECTION TO THOSE 
PICTURES, BUT I WAS DISAPPOINTED IN THE WAY THEY WERE 
17
 j HANDLED, TO SAY THE LEAST 
18
 I LET'S PROCEED WITH THE OTHER PICTURES THAT WE 
NEED TO SEE. 
2 0
 I MS. KNIGHT-EAGAN: YOUR HONOR, IN CHAMBERS YESTER 
21
 DAY I HAD EXPLAINED TO THE COURT THAT WE HAD NOT MADE PHOTO-
2 2
 I GRAPHIC DUPLICATES OF EACH OF THE SLIDES BUT ONLY THOSE THAT 




 BY DR. GREY TO EXPLAIN HIS TESTIMONY. THOSE WE WANT TO ADMIT 
25 SUBSTANTIVELY ALONG WITH THE SLIDES. AS LONG AS WE'RE CLEAR 
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ADDENDUM H 
FROM PROSECUTOR'S CLOSING ARGUMENT 
"We next talk about witnesses who chronologically came next, and 
those are the 7-Eleven witnesses. And in this regard I would 
indicate to you that these people had no bias, no motive to come 
into this courtroom and tell you something that wasn't the truth" 
(T. 854). 
"[Miyako's shirt] was found in the parking lot at the residence 
where defendant lived and where the fight had occurred earlier and 
the child's death had occurred. This is important because I think, 
again, it's an indication of the defendant's intent" (T. 859). 
WI would suggest to you that the police witnesses did an excellent 
job in this case, in their testimony, and their conscientious police 
work in connection with the case" (T. 868). 
"About a year before the child died [Carlos and his brother] had a 
fight over levi's and the defendant exhibited some real anger, 
kicked in a door, slapped his brother in the back of the neck. 
Well, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I think that's a telling 
thing too" (T. 875). 
"And when [Antoinette] left, I would submit to you, ladies and 
gentlemen of the jury, [Carlos! finally decided on a way to get 
even" (T. 877-78). 
NOTE: Other such statements occur at T. 848, 852, 854, 858, 861, 
865, 868, 872, 877, 878, 879, 881. 
